

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

OVERCOMING AMBIVALENCE: THE CASE FOR JAPANESE MARTIAL INTERNATIONALISM

by

Alex R. Greig

September 2002

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Edward A. Olsen
H. Lyman Miller

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2002	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Overcoming Ambivalence: The Case for Japanese Martial Internationalism			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR: Alex R. Greig				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Japan can best satisfy its international security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions. The thesis labels this alternative military posture "martial internationalism." An understanding of how Japanese military policy serves its overall international security interests is a central concern of this thesis. Japan's international security interests are defined as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance. Factors considered in this argument include trends in Japan's postwar military policy evolution and recent military activities and developments. The nature of Japan's current domestic military policy debate is analyzed in terms of relevant political, social, military, and economic perspectives. Regional and international ramifications of a more militarily assertive Japan are explored. The thesis investigates the potential for martial internationalism to realize Japan's international security interests and to permit a greater Japanese military contribution to the ongoing War on Terrorism. Finally, the thesis offers specific recommendations for both Japan and the United States toward implementing this alternative strategic design.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Japan, Northeast Asia, China, Peacekeeping Operations, U.S.-Japan alliance, Defense, Security, Coalitions, Terrorism, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, ASEAN, Internationalism, Military			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 127	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

**OVERCOMING AMBIVALENCE: THE CASE FOR JAPANESE MARTIAL
INTERNATIONALISM**

Alex R. Greig
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., The Ohio State University, 1996

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2002**

Author: Alex R. Greig

Approved by: Edward A. Olsen
Thesis Advisor

H. Lyman Miller
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Japan can best satisfy its international security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions. The thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial internationalism.” An understanding of how Japanese military policy serves its overall international security interests is a central concern of this thesis. Japan’s international security interests are defined as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance. Factors considered in this argument include trends in Japan’s postwar military policy evolution and recent military activities and developments. The nature of Japan’s current domestic military policy debate is analyzed in terms of relevant political, social, military, and economic perspectives. Regional and international ramifications of a more militarily assertive Japan are explored. The thesis investigates the potential for martial internationalism to realize Japan’s international security interests and to permit a greater Japanese military contribution to the ongoing War on Terrorism. Finally, the thesis offers specific recommendations for both Japan and the United States toward implementing this alternative strategic design.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	JAPAN’S SECURITY INTERESTS.....	2
	1. Shaping a Stable International Security Environment.....	3
	2. Supporting the United Nations	5
	3. Upholding the Japan-U.S. Alliance.....	5
B.	METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION.....	5
C.	RELEVANCE.....	7
II.	THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MILITARY POLICY	9
A.	OCCUPATION AND ANTIMILITARISM (1945 – 1954).....	9
	1. The Imperial Legacy	9
	2. “Remaking Japan”	11
B.	JAPAN AS COLD WARRIOR (1954 – 1989).....	18
	1. Reanimation	18
	2. New Assertiveness	24
C.	AN UNCERTAIN POWER (1989 – 2002)	28
	1. The Turbulent 1990s.....	28
	2. Japan and September 11.....	32
D.	SUMMARY	34
III.	JAPAN’S CONTEMPORARY MILITARY POLICY DEBATE	37
A.	CRITICAL ISSUES.....	37
	1. Constitutional Revision	37
	2. Collective Defense	39
	3. Use of Force.....	41
B.	JAPAN IN 2002.....	41
	1. Political Situation	41
	a. <i>Party Interests</i>	43
	b. <i>Public Pressures</i>	48
	c. <i>Bureaucratic Interests</i>	50
	d. <i>Decision-Making</i>	52
	2. Economic Situation	53
	3. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces	57
	a. <i>Capabilities</i>	58
	b. <i>Suitability for Coalition Operations</i>	61
	c. <i>Influence on Military Policy</i>	63
C.	MILITARY POSTURES.....	65
	1. Pacifistic Internationalism	65
	2. Autonomy.....	67
	3. Static Ambivalence or “More of the Same”	69
IV.	THE CASE FOR MARTIAL INTERNATIONALISM.....	71
A.	THE STRATEGY.....	71

B.	DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS.....	74
C.	REGIONAL OPPOSITION	75
1.	China.....	75
2.	North Korea.....	79
D.	REGIONAL ANXIETY	82
1.	South Korea	82
2.	Russia.....	84
E.	INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT	86
1.	The United States	86
2.	ASEAN.....	90
3.	The United Nations	92
F.	THE WAR ON TERRORISM – A LOST OPPORTUNITY?	94
V.	CONCLUSION.....	99
A.	CONCLUSIONS.....	99
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS	100
	LIST OF REFERENCES	103
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	109

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Japanese Military Postures and Relevant Security-Related Issues	73
----------	---	----

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people supported and encouraged me during the completion of this thesis and throughout the course of my studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Personally, I am deeply grateful for my wife Dawn and the love, patience, and guidance she gave me during our stay here in Monterey. I am also thankful for our baby Sam and the joy he has brought to our lives and for making me laugh. For my father, James, I am grateful for his love and for instilling in me an appreciation for education and the wider world that has so shaped my life.

Academically, I am indebted to Dr. Edward Olsen and Dr. H. Lyman Miller for their assistance in composing this thesis and for imparting upon me a small measure of their knowledge of Asia. Their enthusiasm for teaching junior military officers has impressed me as a great credit to their character and their service to our country.

Professionally, I am thankful for the many fine leaders I have been fortunate enough to serve with, especially Captain Gerald F. DeConto. As my commanding officer on USS SIMPSON (FFG 56), Captain DeConto pushed me to take a chance and accept orders to Japan despite my initial misgivings. This introduction to Japan and East Asia heightened my interest in the region and led me to pursue further education here at NPS. Regrettably, Captain DeConto was killed in the line of duty while working in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. For his leadership, mentoring, and sound advice, I thank him here.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1952, Japan has sought to regain the international respect and prestige it enjoyed prior to its era of imperial adventurism. Today, in the face of a burgeoning multipolar geopolitical system and a renewed affirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, demands for Japan to come to terms with and exercise its military power in support of multinational coalitions have become more pressing. The Japanese practice of “checkbook diplomacy” is becoming increasingly untenable as it fails to achieve Japan’s international security interests. These international security interests are defined here as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment; (2) supporting the United Nations; and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that Japan can best satisfy these international security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions. The thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial internationalism.”

On one hand, Japan faces considerable domestic and regional opposition to the use of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in any but the most limited missions. These interests tend to favor a pacifist Japanese military orientation. Conversely, reasoned and legitimate use of its military in support of the interests of the international community presents Japan with a significant opportunity to bolster its prestige and leadership position in global affairs. In spite of this, many people fear that increased military activity could lead to a resurgence of Japanese militarism or, to a lesser degree, a military posture of autonomy. Because of these conflicting influences, Japan remains in a state of virtual paralysis regarding its national military policy – a military posture the thesis labels “static ambivalence.”

Yet, history shows that despite this ambivalent attitude, Japanese military policy has evolved significantly since the end of the Second World War. This is especially true in the last ten years. Shifts from Japan’s initial postwar pacifism were few in number but dramatic in their effect, demonstrating a tendency over time toward fewer constraints and greater flexibility of action. During the early years of the Cold War, Japan focused almost solely on economic growth and recovery while only reluctantly succumbing to

American pressures to provide for its own defense. When Japan achieved economic power in the 1970s, its military policy became even more connected to the other two pillars of the comprehensive security triad: diplomacy and trade. This forced wider the gap between Japanese and American views of the alliance. Later, Soviet, then Chinese and North Korean security threats prompted Japan to assert itself more in the military arena. These actions brought the nation into greater harmony with American global defense strategies and greatly strengthened the alliance in the 1990s. Finally, with the recent advent of the War on Terrorism, Japan has received a momentous opportunity to reform its military policy and embark on a renewed path toward becoming a “normal” nation.

Before this is ever possible, Japan must overcome an enormously divisive internal debate concerning its military policies. Essential to this debate is the resolution of three contentious issues: constitutional revision (especially Article 9 that prohibits war), the right of collective defense, and the use of force by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Furthermore, the current government is confronted by a gridlock of competing political factors. Among these are party interests, public pressures, excessive bureaucratic power, and the problematic nature of Japanese consensus-based decision making. In addition, Japan’s economy is beset by troubles and faces a highly uncertain future. Given the Japanese government’s long-standing focus on economic security over military security, this situation portends further difficulties in effectively developing future national military policies. Last, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are plagued with problems including inadequacies for coalition warfare and a limited input into the policy-making process.

Therefore, Japan requires a new military posture in order to satisfy competing domestic demands while achieving its international security goals. A pacifist option is unrealistic while an autonomous posture is too provocative and potentially destabilizing. Efforts to find a compromise in the form of static ambivalence have worked in the past, but owing to constitutional restrictions, are becoming increasingly complicated and unable to meet the international security challenges of the post-Cold War world. Clearly, the best alternative is to find a middle ground between the policy paralysis of static

ambivalence and the overt aggressiveness of an autonomous posture. It is here that the thesis presents the case for Japanese martial internationalism as a possible solution to this strategic dilemma.

This posture represents an assertive yet cooperative potential Japanese military posture. It envisions full Japanese military participation within multilateral security arrangements as well as within UN-sanctioned coalition operations. Japan would assume a greater share of its own national defense while remaining allied to the United States. The Japanese constitution would be revised to permit military activities accepted as norms by the international community and in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In essence, Japan would be a militarily “normal” nation, but one bound to -- and a vital component of -- international security regimes. In this way, a domestically acceptable compromise is attained while enabling Japan to play an active military role in the international community.

Martial internationalism supports all three of Japan’s international security interests. First, by contributing military power to UN-sanctioned multinational coalitions and peacekeeping operations, it actively supports the shaping of stable international security environment. Such results are not possible by Japan acting unilaterally or even bilaterally within the Japan-U.S. alliance. Second, martial internationalism dynamically supports the United Nations by supplying a level of effort commensurate with Japan’s capability to provide. Third, the posture upholds the Japan-U.S. alliance by permitting collective security arrangements with U.S. forces and active support of American operations in combat operations.

Martial internationalism does not disrupt the strategic balance of power in East Asia. Although China and North Korea represent the most likely sources of opposition, these concerns are not overpowering enough to prevent the adoption of the posture. Instead, the support of the United States, Southeast Asia, and the global community as represented by the United Nations all outweigh the mitigating factors of countries opposed to, or apprehensive of, increased Japanese military activity.

In conclusion, Japan's position in the world bestows upon it special responsibilities in the area of international security. As one of the primary recipients of the benefits of the international political and economic system, Japan is obligated to provide for the integrity of the system. As recent events have shown, the United States cannot preserve peace and prosperity throughout the world single-handedly. A military posture that simply ensures Japan's territorial defense is not enough. Japan requires a military policy that enhances its global leadership, prestige, and honor by fully supporting the interests of the international community and by sustaining the strength of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

This thesis offers a glimpse of one potential Japanese strategic design capable of succeeding in this heated environment.

I. INTRODUCTION

“Japanese will pay money, perhaps break a sweat, but never spill a drop of blood. Why is that?”

--U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost
to LDP leader Keiichi Miyazawa, 1990¹

Since 1952, Japan has sought to regain the international respect and prestige it enjoyed prior to its era of imperial adventurism. Under the watchful protection of the United States, Japan accomplished an astonishing industrial recovery that elevated it to the status of a global economic superpower. In this same period, however, Japan also underwent a dramatic rearmament process that restored its position as a major regional military power. Throughout this renewal, the United States, Japan's neighbors, and the Japanese people themselves all approached the issue of Japanese military power with ambivalence and anxiety.

Now, in the face of a burgeoning multipolar geopolitical system and a renewed affirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, demands for Japan to come to terms with and exercise its military power in support of multinational coalitions have become more pressing. Major world powers increasingly criticize Japan's practice of “checkbook diplomacy,” a negative attitude that significantly hinders Japan's progress toward becoming a world leader.² On one hand, Japan faces considerable domestic and regional opposition to the use of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in any but the most limited missions. Conversely, reasoned and legitimate use of its military in support of the interests of the international community presents Japan with a significant opportunity to bolster its prestige and leadership position in global affairs. As a result of these conflicting influences, Japan remains in a state of virtual paralysis regarding its national military policy.

Taking this into account, this thesis argues that Japan can best satisfy its international security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions. The thesis labels this alternative military posture “martial internationalism.”

¹ Maeda Tetsuo, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Force*, (Chicago: Edition Q Inc., 1995), 285.

² National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2002), 16.

A. JAPAN'S SECURITY INTERESTS

An understanding of how Japanese military policy serves its overall international security interests is a critical subject of this thesis. Japan is confronted with a variety of options concerning its future national military policy. Japan's strategy of comprehensive security and its firm commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance served its national interests extraordinarily well during the years of postwar recovery and the Cold War era.³ Since 1991, however, this strategy has developed into what this thesis labels "static ambivalence." This description reflects Japan's continued support of the U.S. alliance mingled with an indecisive approach toward what role Japanese military power should play within both the alliance and the new world order.

In consequence, Japan is becoming increasingly aware of the challenges it faces in the dramatically altered political, strategic, and economic global environment of the 21st century. Such trends have been especially noticeable in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the wave of security-related legislation addressed by the Japanese government. Unmistakably, these changed circumstances have prompted Japan to reevaluate its future.

At the present time, Japan possesses sufficient military strength from its own forces and from those of the United States to effectively deter any major attack upon its homeland. Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the relationship between Japanese military policy and its ability to uphold its international security interests rather than those simply concerned with national defense. These international security interests are defined here as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance.

³ Michael J. Green and Richard J. Samuels, *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order*, NBR Analysis, Volume 5, No. 4, (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1994).

1. Shaping a Stable International Security Environment

The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) states that the fundamental principles of Japanese defense policy are:⁴

- Maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy
- Not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries
- Upholding civilian control
- Adhering to the three non-nuclear principles⁵
- Maintaining firmly the Japan-U.S. security arrangements

Within this framework of principles and the tenets of the Japanese constitution, Japan maintains a defensive capability in the form of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF or SDF) and other national security assets. Although Japanese prefer the term “defensive capabilities” to “military,” for greater simplicity the term “military” will be used here. This distinction is important to note since recent controversial statements by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi indicate a growing acceptance of the fact that the JSDF is in fact a “military” in the traditional sense of the word.⁶ Japan’s military serves three primary capacities. First, it provides Japan with the ability to prevent direct or indirect aggressions against its homeland. The JDA summarizes this traditional role simply as providing for “national defense.” Second, the Japanese military provides national means for coping with “large scale disasters and various other situations.” Providing relief efforts in the face of disasters is a clearly defined mission. “Various other situations” is described as responding to security threats in the “areas surrounding Japan” indicating a regional focus. The third role of the Japanese military is to contribute to the “creation of a more stable security environment.”

The first two roles pertain to purely territorial concerns and thus will not be dealt with in great detail here. Northeast Asia continues to remain a region fraught with political and military tensions. The region particularly suffers from the lack of any binding international security arrangements. The surrogate for such a system is a limited series of American bilateral alliances. As an additional consideration, Japan’s geography as a resource-poor archipelagic

4 Quoted from the JDA website [Online] at <<http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html>> [28 August 2002].

5 Japan will not manufacture, possess, or permit the basing of nuclear weapons within the country.

6 “Koizumi Hails Peaceful Resolution, BBC News website [Online] at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1293772.stm>> [3 September 2002].

state makes it heavily dependent upon sea-borne access to the global market for its national livelihood and prosperity.

This thesis is most concerned with the third role, that of Japan's declared desire to use its defensive capabilities to shape the international security situation. The JDA describes "contribution to creation of a more stable security environment" in the following statements:⁷

- a. Contribute to efforts for international peace through participation in international peace cooperation activities, and contribute to promotion of international cooperation through participation in international disaster relief activities.
- b. Continue to promote security dialogues and exchanges among defense authorities to enhance mutual confidence with countries, including neighboring states.
- c. Cooperate with efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations in the areas of arms control and disarmament for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as controlling and regulating conventional weapons, including land mines.

And also in reference to the postures to be maintained by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces:⁸

The Self-Defense Forces must be capable of participating in international peace cooperation activities and international disaster relief activities in a timely and appropriate manner to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the international community.

These statements, though largely unspecific, unmistakably assert Japan's belief that the military can be used, within the restrictions of the fundamental principles, to support operations that further the security interests of the international community. Such intent can be translated as "shaping a stable international security environment."

⁷ Quoted from the JDA website [Online] at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.html> [28 August 2002].

⁸ Ibid.

2. Supporting the United Nations

Although the “international community” remains a nebulous construct, the United Nations (UN) best represents it. Among the host of organizations that are multinational in composition and interests, only the United Nations can truly claim to symbolize the security interests of all the nations of the world. The United Nations Charter and its many declarations advocate a wide variety of humanitarian issues. All of these activities are firmly supported by Japan. In this context, however, “supporting the United Nations” will refer to Japan’s active efforts to prevent actions or developments that threaten the peaceful relations between states or peoples of the world, especially those proscribed by the United Nations.

3. Upholding the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Since 1952, Japan has pragmatically upheld its alliance with the United States for a variety of reasons. Economically, the relationship gives Japan access to the world’s largest market for its exports. Politically, it allows Japan the benefit of close association with what became in the post-Cold War era the world’s only superpower. Socially, the alliance fosters a free exchange of people and ideas between two relatively dissimilar cultures. Strategically, the alliance provides Japan with defense from external aggression. Going further, the JDA states:⁹

This close cooperative bilateral relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, facilitates Japanese efforts for peace and stability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations activities.

The Japan-U.S. alliance is a critical source of Japanese political and economic strength. It serves as the backbone for security in the Asia-Pacific region. Significantly, it also affords Japan a vehicle through which to exercise its support of American and United Nations interests in preserving peace and stability throughout the world.

B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate why “martial internationalism” can best satisfy Japan’s security interests. To do this, it will reveal the numerous domestic and foreign factors

that shape Japanese military policy. In addition, it will attempt to determine the likely implications of Japan adopting such a controversial military posture. Accordingly, the thesis undertakes a methodological approach that starts by asking the following pertinent questions:

- What trends can be discerned from the evolution of contemporary Japanese defense policy?
- What is the nature of Japan's current military policy debate?
- What are the potential domestic and international ramifications of Japan assuming a combatant role in multinational coalition operations?
- How can assuming such a posture satisfy Japan's security interests better than its present condition of static ambivalence?
- Why is the ongoing War on Terrorism an ideal starting place for Japan to implement a new military posture such as martial internationalism?

In an organized manner, each of these critical questions will be addressed in succeeding chapters. Chapter Two establishes a foundation for the remainder of the thesis by describing the evolution of Japan's contemporary military policy. In this examination, the chapter demonstrates that despite considerable domestic and foreign resistance, Japanese military policy has inexorably become less constrained and more capable of action in international affairs.

Building upon this historical foundation, Chapter Three examines the nature of Japan's current military policy debate. The chapter begins by illustrating the critical military policy issues of constitutional revision, collective defense, and the exercise of military force. Next, the present political, economic, and military situations in Japan are discussed in relation to its national military policy. Finally, the chapter closes by exploring the difficulties inherent to three popular military postures: pacifist internationalism, autonomy, and continued static ambivalence. Each alternative posture is examined in terms of its potential implications as well as its ability to satisfy Japan's security interests.

With an appreciation of Japan's contemporary state of affairs and an awareness of alternative military postures, Chapter Four presents the case for martial internationalism. First, the chapter offers a description of the strategy and its potential domestic effects. Next, the

⁹ Ibid.

thesis discusses Japan's most important foreign relations and how martial internationalism might affect them. This is completed in terms of likely sources of foreign opposition, anxiety, and encouragement. Finally, the posture's ability to secure Japan's international security interests is examined in reference to the ongoing War on Terrorism.

Chapter Five ends the thesis by summarizing the argument and by offering conclusions regarding the future utility of martial internationalism. It finishes by presenting specific recommendations for both Japan and the United States toward implementing this alternative strategic design.

C. RELEVANCE

In Japan, no subject is as divisive as that of national military policy. It is largely for this reason that static ambivalence has prevailed for so long. Nonetheless, given the changing geopolitical environment faced by Japan, the nation must modify its military posture appropriately to cope with an uncertain future. This thesis does not seek to patronize, provoke, or antagonize Japanese regarding their concerns in this highly sensitive area. Rather, it seeks to offer an alternative, if somewhat controversial, vision regarding their country's future military policy.

Japan's position in the world bestows upon it special responsibilities in the area of international security. As one of the primary recipients of the benefits of the international political and economic system, Japan is obligated to provide for the integrity of the system. A military posture that simply ensures Japan's territorial defense is not enough. Japan requires a military policy that enhances its global leadership, prestige, and honor by fully supporting the interests of the international community and by sustaining the strength of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

For the United States, Japan remains its most important ally in Asia, and perhaps the world. As recent events have shown, the United States cannot preserve peace and prosperity throughout the world single-handedly. Although the American military currently enjoys an unprecedented global reach and combat capability, allied contributions and multinational coalitions remain essential to international security. For this reason, any potential shift in the

military posture of Japan is a critical concern of U.S. strategic planners. This thesis offers a glimpse of one potential Japanese strategic design.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MILITARY POLICY

Japanese military policy has evolved significantly since the end of the Second World War. Major shifts from Japan's initial postwar pacifism were few in number but dramatic in their effect. The overall pattern of development has been one of reaction to external pressures, either from Japan's American ally or from changes to its perceived threat environment. As a result, the history of Japan's military policy evolution demonstrates a tendency over time toward fewer constraints and greater flexibility of action. This chapter illustrates these trends by describing the foremost proceedings of the postwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods.

A. OCCUPATION AND ANTIMILITARISM (1945 – 1954)

1. The Imperial Legacy

The ascendancy of modern militarism in Japan occurred due to many factors. First, combined pressures of domestic and international economic turmoil appeared to threaten Japan's progress toward achieving industrial parity with the West. The weakness of the Taisho Democracy (1912-1926) and its seeming inability to control these economic failures led many to call for a more authoritarian government. Many Japanese envied the apparent success of fascism in Italy, and later Germany. They regarded these new regimes as positive examples for an alternative government that could solve Japan's problems. Furthermore, militarists in Japanese society worried over secular ideas concerning the emperor that had arisen during Taisho's intellectualism. They felt these beliefs clashed with the precepts of the state Shinto religion and undermined the spiritual power of the emperor. Finally, external forces such as the rising threat of Chinese nationalism prompted a Japanese military response. Taken as a whole, these factors, in combination with the aforementioned reality of Japanese military autonomy, resulted in the restructuring of Japan along fiercely militaristic principles.¹⁰

The ascendancy of the militarists had far reaching consequences. Leftist or anti-imperial criticisms of the government were violently suppressed. Drawing upon the historical

¹⁰ The rise of political militarism summarized from Louis D. Hayes' *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 26-28.

precedents set by the Tokugawa regime and its internal secret police, the *metsuke*, the Imperial Japanese government revitalized its own “thought police” in the form of the *kempeitai*. Use of the *kempeitai* and various “neighborhood associations” enabled the government to firmly establish its presence among the people, monitor their activities, and threaten punishment for incorrect behaviors.¹¹ An additional influence upon society during this period was the further homogenizing of the Japanese population through military service. Young men from all over Japan were brought together in the service of the emperor strengthening government claims of national and spiritual unity.

Beginning with territorial disputes with China over Manchuria in 1931, by 1937 Japan was fully at war throughout the Asian continent progressing as far south as Vietnam. Remarkably, however, Japan negotiated a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. With the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, Japan allied with Germany and Italy forming the Axis coalition. This development united the conflict in Europe with that of Asia. Subsequently, when Japan’s drive into China became frustrated, its leaders made the fateful strategic mistake of attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines in 1941.¹² Through 1942, Japan rapidly enlarged its territorial conquests throughout the Pacific in an attempt to create an “East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would establish a Japanese economic autarky and provide the empire with the industrial potential necessary to complete its conquest of China. Throughout this period, Japan embraced a philosophy of pan-Asianism and attempted to justify its actions to its new subjects as “liberating” them from Western colonial and racial oppression. Despite these claims, non-Japanese peoples within the empire experienced quite a different reality.

Driven by an ideology of twisted *bushido*, emperor-worship, and a dogmatic belief in their racial uniqueness, divinity, and superiority, the Japanese military during this time discredited itself with a long list of atrocious crimes against humanity, a legacy that taints Japan to the present day.¹³ For their newly “liberated” subjects, this meant the harsh suppression of political autonomy, prohibition of local cultural practices, and the often-brutal treatment of

¹¹ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 48-50.

¹² Robert B. Edgerton, *Warriors of the Rising Sun*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 252-255.

¹³ Edgerton describes the Japanese military’s descent from chivalry to barbarism in *Warriors of the Rising Sun*, 305-324.

prisoners and laborers. Conquered populations and captured enemies alike suffered a wide scope of inhuman treatment by the Japanese military. Among these practices was slavery, forced prostitution of women, torture, rape, summary executions, and human experimentation using chemical and biological warfare agents.¹⁴ Clearly, the militarists of the 1930's succeeded in eradicating Japan's traditions of chivalry that had prevailed in its previous wars.

In the end, Japan's adventure into Pacific hegemony was short-lived with the massive military response of the United States. From 1942 to 1945, U.S. forces succeeded in stripping Japan of its overseas possessions, isolating the home islands from all economic support, and bombing the nation into ruins. On August 14, 1945, the war concluded with Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies following the combined atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the threat of Soviet invasion from the north.

Japan's experience with militarism and imperial expansion brought disastrous results. Between 1937 and 1945, Japan suffered approximately 2.3 million battlefield casualties and over 800,000 civilian deaths. Over 70 percent of its pre-war industrial capacity was destroyed and American bombing devastated virtually every Japanese city except Kyoto.¹⁵ Politically, Japan was reviled by most of the international community. For the first time in its history, Japan suffered the humiliating loss of its sovereignty and the unprecedented occupation of its home islands by foreign military forces.

2. "Remaking Japan"

The occupation of Japan by the United States attempted to stamp out militarism in Japanese society. Confronted by the terrible consequences of its failure in the Second World War, Japan almost unanimously embraced the hope for salvation offered by its American conquerors. Many American policy-makers declared their desire for Japan to become an "Asian Switzerland" and set upon the task of "remaking" Japanese society.¹⁶

¹⁴ Edgerton, *Warriors of the Rising Sun*, 317.

¹⁵ Thomas L. Wilborn, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 3.

¹⁶ An outstanding source of information on America's relationship to Japan can be found in Walter LeFeber's *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997).

From 1945 to 1947, the United States vigorously pursued dual policies to eliminate Japan's war potential and punish it for past aggression, while at the same time creating a strong, capitalist, and democratic ally in Asia.¹⁷ Although an international "Far Eastern Commission" had been established in Washington representing all of the countries involved in the war against Japan, this organization coordinating the reconstruction of Japan existed more as an elaborate façade.¹⁸ In all vital matters, the United States firmly directed the course of affairs in Japan through General Douglas MacArthur in his office of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Moreover, from 1945 until 1951, the United States asserted its control over the Japanese transformation process by ensuring that, apart from very limited contact with British occupation forces, Japan remained "virtually isolated from the rest of the world."¹⁹ The United States widened Japanese support for its actions by utilizing Japanese civilian institutions to carry out SCAP directives rather than subjecting Japan to direct military control. This practice, in conjunction with the extraordinary preservation of the emperor, limited numbers and locations of occupation forces, and the generally benevolent attitude of the Americans, as compared to the alternatives of being occupied by China or the Soviet Union, significantly aided in the process of reform and encouraged pro-American sentiment.

The United States achieved substantial successes in reforming and demilitarizing Japanese society.²⁰ SCAP efforts to democratize Japan included the prosecution of wartime leaders, release of political prisoners, universal suffrage, dissolution of the family-owned *zaibatsu* industrial conglomerates, promotion of labor unions, and redistributing land for promoting increased food production and decreasing the power of local landlords. Additionally, SCAP ordered many broad reforms, including demobilization of the population, conversion of military industries to civilian use, and the creation of non-Confucian based educational systems. The demystification of the emperor as a deity on January 1, 1946, disbanding of "thought police," acceptance of diverse and even leftist political opinion, and the

¹⁷ Nakamura Takafusa, *A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989*, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998), 265.

¹⁸ W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 215.

¹⁹ Wolf Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 28.

²⁰ Specific details of these numerous reforms can be found in Meiron and Susie Harries' *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan*, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987).

resurgence of multiple political parties further served this effort. All of these liberal reforms culminated in the establishment of the bicameral National Diet and the development and adoption of Japan's Constitution in 1947.

The 1947 Constitution, chiefly drafted by idealistic Americans enamored with "New Deal" principles, decidedly determined the future path of Japan. With regard to foreign relations and militarism, the most noteworthy characteristic of the Constitution is Article 9 that states:²¹

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes...land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be maintained.

Although Article 9 was included mainly on the personal direction of MacArthur, it also served broader interests. Its inclusion expressed not only the desires of the American government to hobble Japanese potential as an adversary and bind it to American military protection, but also satisfied the yearnings of the Japanese people to avoid the catastrophe of recurring militarism.²² In the end, however, although the policies of SCAP and the new constitution gave Japan the outward appearance of a liberal democracy devoted to peace, this idealism later produced problems for the United States as it became more embroiled in the geopolitical struggle of the Cold War.²³

Beginning in late 1947, the United States modified its approach to reforming Japan because of the burgeoning threat of the Soviet Union and international communism. Mounting concerns over the global spread of communism, particularly in China and Korea, and difficulties experienced by European colonial powers in restoring their authority over Asian-Pacific possessions played an important role in shifting attitudes toward Japanese reconstruction. Furthermore, an increased interest in Japan was demonstrated by statements of American strategic planners, including George F. Kennan in the State Department and Undersecretary of the Army, William Draper Jr. Their influence greatly impacted upon

²¹ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, 329.

²² For a comprehensive discussion of Japanese attitudes during the American occupation see John W. Dower's *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999).

²³ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 220.

American formulations of how Japan would be included in Washington's overall global containment policy. Specifically, Kennan illustrated Japan's strategic potential for the United States in NSC 13/2. His characterization led many to believe in the concept, later coined by Nakasone Yasuhiro, of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Northwest Pacific.²⁴

Japanese pacifism flourished in this heated environment. One cause was the return to politics of many Taisho-era internationalists. Suppressed for over 15 years by the militarist government, they sought to restore Japan's connections to the rest of the world and resisted U.S. plans for rearming their society. These leaders joined with a growing number of Japanese in a feeling of "dual victimization."²⁵ They felt anger at the ruinous failures of the wartime militarists and spite for the Americans who they believed had ruthlessly destroyed and conquered Japan to further its own power interests against the Soviet Union. The influence of these views was powerful and implanted a set of four "never agains" into the Japanese psyche. One author summarized these resolutions as:²⁶

1. Never again depend solely upon the military for achieving domestic or international goals.
2. Never again permit the homeland to suffer mass domestic bombing.
3. Never again permit the military to have influence over public policy or to threaten politicians, bureaucrats, or business leaders.
4. Never again discount the importance of superior technology, advanced weaponry, and the capacity of mass production.

At the same time, the United States grew ever more worried that Japanese social reform had gone too far and had begun to weaken Japan as a future ally.²⁷ Such developments resulted in a "reverse course" within Japanese politics and society. The "reverse course" occurred for a variety of reasons and began largely in late 1948. First, it seemed that the

²⁴ Patrick Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), 14.

²⁵ Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 7.

²⁶ Wilborn, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?", 4.

²⁷ Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 826-827.

reforms were failing to contain economic turmoil or to create a lasting, coherent national government. Second, the rise of Japanese labor unions, despite having been initially advocated by General MacArthur,²⁸ spawned American fears that these organizations were acting as agents of Marxist principles. Finally, American interest in dramatic social liberalization waned in favor of maintaining a stable, conservative, and capitalistic government.²⁹ In turn, the Japanese themselves resisted this shift only moderately given the short span of liberalization efforts and the fact that leadership positions throughout society remained primarily filled by individuals of politically conservative outlooks.

The advance of the “communist monolith” throughout the Asian region also justified the shift in American policy toward Japan. First, in 1949, the fall of China to the communists brought exceptional pressures to bear upon President Harry Truman and the Democratic Party. Perceived as “losing China to the communists,” President Truman grew determined to avoid similar failures elsewhere in Asia. This fact largely influenced the U.S. entry into the Korean War in 1950. In Japan, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru deemed the Korean War a “gift from the gods” as over \$4 billion worth of military procurement orders surged into Japanese industries.³⁰ Additionally, SCAP dedicated more of its efforts to Korea and turned over almost all of its governing functions back to the Japanese.

Thus from 1948 to 1954, Japan became progressively a full member of the U.S.-led Cold War coalition. The primary Japanese figure directing the resurgence during this period was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. An ex-diplomat who had been ostracized by Japan’s wartime leaders, he was socially conservative and a longtime outspoken advocate of close ties to the United States and Great Britain.³¹ He proved the ideal leader for shaping Japan’s post-war economy, society, and international relations. Yoshida placed the development and expansion of Japan’s economy and industry as his primary goal while conceding Japan’s military protection to the United States. To accomplish this, Yoshida’s policies encouraged capital growth and foreign investment, curbing of radical labor movements, introduction of

²⁸ This in itself was remarkable since MacArthur was an outspoken and very conservative Republican.

²⁹ Warren S. Hunsberger and Richard B. Finn, “Japan’s Historical Record” ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan’s Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997), 24.

³⁰ Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, 826.

³¹ Ibid., 824.

leading edge technologies, and increased government subsidies to heavy industry. These policies later became known collectively as the “Yoshida Doctrine.”³²

Amid rising international tensions, Yoshida led Japan’s return to sovereignty.³³ Beginning in 1951, both the San Francisco Peace Treaty formally ending the war with Japan and a Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan were signed almost simultaneously. However, this did not happen without significant difficulties.³⁴ First, Australia and New Zealand were concerned that Japan was getting off the hook too easily and feared possible resurgent Japanese militarism. To quell this fear, John Foster Dulles, designer of the agreements with Japan, also arranged the tripartite ANZUS Treaty. In addition, a U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded for the same reason. In the end, despite assurances of war reparations, China, India, Burma and the Soviet Union all refused to accept the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951. This demonstration of mistrust in the Japan-U.S. alliance by these countries, or their successors, continues to the present day.³⁵

The creation of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States received mixed reactions within Japan. Japanese conservatives within Yoshida’s clique recognized the enormous potential for economic growth that association with the United States would bring. Since Washington had cancelled trade relations with China and the Soviet Union, it pressured Japan to do likewise. In exchange, America opened its markets to Japanese goods with relatively few restrictions. This served to further bolster Japan’s growing economy. Additionally, most Japanese were happy to be able to devote the majority of their national income to modernizing industry rather than spending it on costly military defenses. The occupation by American forces and the intrusive SCAP office ended in 1952. Although Washington coaxed Japan to rearm itself in the face of the communist threat, Yoshida deftly maneuvered around this citing the prohibitions contained in the new constitution.³⁶ Yoshida conceded, however, to the transformation of Japan’s national police forces into the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. Protected under the American “nuclear umbrella,” Japan was free to

³² Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 230.

³³ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 288-293.

³⁴ Ibid., 288.

³⁵ Nakamura Takafusa. *A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989*, 308.

³⁶ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 298-299.

pursue a course of reconstruction at the relatively small expense of providing bases and logistical support for its new American allies.³⁷

All of these events did not come about without opposition from within. Specifically, members of Japan's Communist Party stated, "Japan has been subjected to U.S. imperialism and lost its freedom and independence".³⁸ Numerous riots and antigovernment activity continued through 1952 resulting in repressive internal security policies to control the radical left.

Despite his impressive record of achievements, Yoshida failed to create a viable political party structure.³⁹ He was a better administrator than parliamentarian and his stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise diminished his political influence. In late 1954, Yoshida stepped down from power and passed the reins to Hatoyama Ichiro, a recently "depurged" rightist. Japanese ideological conflicts heightened further with the return to power of many other members of the "old guard" who had held positions of authority in Japan during the war but who had not committed serious enough crimes to merit perpetual exile from politics.⁴⁰ Hatoyama was a popular supporter of business interests who had spent time in prison for his association with the wartime government. He had only recently been permitted to rejoin domestic politics by SCAP. Within a few months, Hatoyama consolidated his political power by combining rival parties to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955.

The LDP became the dominant political force in Japan for many reasons. First, it shunned the divisive ideological beliefs espoused by other parties and instead focused on pragmatic policies that fostered economic growth.⁴¹ Second, it established a close association with Japanese business and industrial interests especially the new *keiretsu*. The *keiretsu*, huge networks of companies linked together by common financial institutions, evolved out of the traditional family-owned *zaibatsu*.⁴² With the vast financial backing of these business

37 Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, 826.

38 Nakamura, Takafusa. *A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989*, 310.

39 Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 230.

40 Warren S. Hunsberger and Richard B. Finn, "Japan's Historical Record," 26-27.

41 Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 77-78.

42 Ibid., 43.

interests, the LDP found it easy to dominate a fragmented consortium of left-leaning political parties.⁴³ In the end, all of these developments created the so-called “1955 system”: a powerful triumvirate comprised of LDP “1 ½ party” politics, the government bureaucracy, and leading business interests.⁴⁴ The strength of this system enabled it to endure for nearly forty years after its formation.

Thus by the end of 1954, Japan was fully set to reenter the global arena on its own. The nine-year period of transition under the American occupation and control decisively established the United States as Japan’s only military ally and its foremost trading partner. Likewise, although Japan resumed its sovereign status its future foreign relations were colored by the lenses of the Cold War and evaluated in relation to the American alliance.

B. JAPAN AS COLD WARRIOR (1954 – 1989)

1. Reanimation

From 1954 to 1989 Japan’s security and foreign policies were characterized by maintaining a close relationship to the United States while engaging in rapid internal economic development. Fully aware of the precarious geostrategic position Japan occupied in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, Japanese leaders sought to continue the protection provided by the United States while carefully fostering increased regional and international involvement.

The early years of the Cold War were a turbulent period for Japanese society. Although efforts had been taken to encourage leftist political diversity and opinions during the occupation years, the advent of the Cold War in Japan created attitudes of intolerance similar to those occurring in the United States during this time.⁴⁵ Japan’s entry into the United Nations in 1956, backed by the support of the U.S. coalition against the objections of the communist bloc of the Soviet Union and China, evidenced this.⁴⁶ On the whole, Japan experienced deep political and ideological divisions that mirrored the polarization of the world as a whole between the coalitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.

⁴³ Ibid., 83.

⁴⁴ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 231-232.

⁴⁵ Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, 849.

⁴⁶ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 311-312.

The Article 9 “peace clause” contained in the 1947 Constitution in concert with the informal “Yoshida Doctrine” significantly affected early concepts of Japanese military policy. In a noteworthy hypocrisy that reflected the realities of the Cold War, although Article 9 proclaims that Japanese “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” the Japanese military was never completely dismantled.⁴⁷ In the face of American pressure, Yoshida permitted assets of the newly established Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) to assist with American amphibious operations during the initial phases of the Korean War.⁴⁸ From October 2 to December 15, 1950, 46 Japanese minesweepers and 1200 former Imperial Japanese Navy personnel cleared mines in the waters east of Wonsan and other Korean ports to facilitate General MacArthur’s northward invasion.⁴⁹ During these operations two Japanese ships were sunk, one sailor killed, and eight others injured. Pragmatically, both the Japanese and American governments largely suppressed public knowledge of Japan’s naval involvement in the Korean War.

Among Prime Minister Yoshida’s final and most important acts were his steps to rearm Japan. During the negotiation of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, he had conceded to Japan providing a measure of its own defense. With the passage of the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law, Japan converted police, security, and coastal safety forces into a *defacto* military. In conjunction with this law, Japan passed the “Ban on Overseas (Defense Force) Dispatch” to assuage the anxieties of domestic left as well as internationally.⁵⁰ These developments enabled Yoshida to pursue his “doctrine” that focused on economic growth and recovery while the United States provided for Japan’s core security needs: a nuclear deterrent, the ability to defeat invasion attempts, regional stability and unobstructed sea lanes.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Evidence of the preservation of Imperial Navy and Army structures and personnel can be found in James E. Auer *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973) and Edwin P. Hoyt, *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*. (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1985).

⁴⁸ The JMSA is Japan’s Coast Guard.

⁴⁹ Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*, 64-67.

⁵⁰ Joseph P. Keddel, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993), 32-33.

⁵¹ Laura Stone, “Whither Trade and Security? A Historical Perspective,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 252.

Later, having resurrected its military, Japanese leaders found it necessary to formally craft policies regarding their use. The first such legislation was the “Basic National Defense Policy” of 1957. This policy contained numerous premises that have guided Japanese military policies ever since. Specifically, it sought to:

1. Support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. Promote the public welfare and enhance the people’s love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan’s security.
3. Develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation’s resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. Deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.⁵²

Loaded with ambiguity, this policy enabled Japan to substantially increase its defense spending and improve overall readiness. In doing so, however, it provoked widespread public outcry. Japan experienced widespread mass protests and riots against the government and its policies, particularly the trends toward increasing military ties to the United States.⁵³

The protests and demonstrations against the government reached a climax during the tenure of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Owing to his checkered past and involvement in the wartime government, Kishi was intensely hated by the Japanese political left which considered him “a war criminal and a thug.”⁵⁴ In fact, the unpopularity of his administration was so strong that nearly every piece of legislation it proposed met with harsh criticism and public outcry. This storm even overshadowed important foreign policy decisions including Kishi’s announcement in 1957 that Japan would follow a course of “Asia-centered diplomacy.”⁵⁵ In this proposal, Kishi declared that despite its close relations to the United States and its

⁵² Keddel, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, 35-38.

⁵³ Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, 849.

⁵⁴ Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, 21.

⁵⁵ Mendl, 99.

unfortunate imperial legacy, Japan would unilaterally concentrate on renewing strong diplomatic ties and cooperative economic relationships to Asian countries.

Although these actions demonstrated the shrewdness by which he could manipulate Washington, his 1960 handling of the modified Japan-U.S. Security Treaty led to his ultimate humiliation and downfall.⁵⁶ Public support for the new treaty was extraordinarily low, and few believed government claims that it would be a “temporary measure until the United Nations could provide Japan with collective security.”⁵⁷ Against widespread protests, in July Kishi forced through the Diet passage of the renewed treaty using police to drive opposition party members from the Diet chamber. These strongman tactics led to even greater unrest and demonstrations causing him to cancel an impending visit by U.S. President Eisenhower.⁵⁸ Kishi subsequently resigned from office, although he remained a behind-the-scenes LDP power broker. The ratification of the new treaty with the United States and Kishi’s removal from power represented a substantial shift in Japanese society, politics, and heralded a new and more liberal phase in Japanese history.

During the 1960s, Japan maintained generally pacifistic military policies as it continued to focus on postwar reconstruction and economic development. Several events demonstrated this trend. First, in order to quell public unrest, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato launched an ambitious “income doubling plan” in 1960.⁵⁹ This policy set the high goal for Japan to double national economic power as well as personal incomes and standards of living by the end of the decade. This was to be accomplished through fostering close ties between the Japanese government and business, leading to the creation of a highly planned national economy. Second, in 1965 the Japanese press discovered that the Japanese Defense Agency had prepared a military operations plan called the “three arrows contingency plan” for dealing with an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula.⁶⁰ The government ineptly handled the leak, provoking mass panic and numerous conspiracy theories that the SDF was about to undertake a military coup. When the matter finally settled out, the government banned the JDA from

⁵⁶ The full text of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty can be found on the Japanese Defense Agency website [Online] at <<http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html>> [28 August 2002].

⁵⁷ Green and Samuels, *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan’s Choices in the New World Order*, 16.

⁵⁸ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 320-321.

⁵⁹ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 248.

⁶⁰ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 194.

producing similar contingency plans. The ban lasted a remarkable thirteen years during the height of the Cold War.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, from November 1964 to July 1972, Japan continued to pursue the “income doubling plan” while maintaining a posture of “low diplomacy” dedicated to building trade relationships with other countries. These measures met with minimal resistance from a steadily weakening Japanese political left. Largely discredited because of the Sino-Soviet split and the devastating Chinese failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, leftist opposition to LDP economic policies became increasingly viewed as unrealistic extremist ranting.⁶¹ Sato’s 1967 arms exports ban and proclamation of “Japan’s three non-nuclear principles” also diminished leftist opposition.⁶² In these declarations, he stated that Japan would not sell military materiel to foreign countries and that Japan would not manufacture, possess, or permit the basing of nuclear weapons within the country. Additionally, he announced that Japan would never permit defense spending to exceed one percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP), although this did not become official policy until 1976 under Prime Minister Miki Takeo.⁶³ Overall, Sato’s support of a non-nuclear, demilitarized state while advancing economically served dual purposes of appeasing domestic concerns while easing regional fears of a resurgent Japan.

The United States played a crucial role in Japan’s revival during this period as its sole ally. Japan-U.S. relations were marked by a fervent desire to preserve the safety afforded by the security treaty while expanding trade relations with America in support of the growing Japanese economy. Through the early years of this period, the United States continued to bolster Japan’s growth by opening its markets to Japanese goods while defending Japan’s reentry into the world community. Japan’s entry into the United Nations in 1956 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964 stand as examples of this support.⁶⁴ In contrast, not all interaction was positive during this period and budding signs of disagreement began to arise. First, evidence arose that Washington provided

⁶¹ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 102 and 108-109.

⁶² Thomas U. Berger, “Alliance Politics and Japan’s Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S. Alliance, Past, Present, and Future*, 196-197.

⁶³ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 239-240.

⁶⁴ Shibusawa Masahide. *Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 32-33.

considerable financial support for the LDP in its founding years through CIA operations determined to ensure a stable, friendly Japanese government.⁶⁵ This interference in Japan's internal affairs harkened to well-remembered bitterness over intrusive SCAP policies during the Occupation years. Secondly, the fiasco surrounding the 1960 security treaty modification caused many Americans to begin to doubt the sincerity of Japan's commitment to containing communism. This ill will festered during the Vietnam War where Japanese cooperation proved little more than lukewarm.⁶⁶ Although Japan provided \$55 million in economic assistance and sent medical teams to South Vietnam, many Americans became angry at Japan for amassing wealth and expanding its Southeast Asian markets while the Vietnam War exerted a vast drain upon the U.S. treasury. Widespread anti-war protests at Japanese universities in 1968 and 1969 acted as further evidence for Americans that the Japanese were not supporting them.⁶⁷ Finally, throughout the 1960s, continued Japanese objections to the American control of Okinawa acted as an added obstacle to closer relations between the two.

By 1969, a combination of these factors brought about a souring of Japanese-U.S. relations and the first indications of a more independent Japanese military policy. In response to increasing domestic turmoil and the disheartening prospects for an American victory in Vietnam, President Nixon outlined a policy that signaled a possible future decrease in the U.S. military presence in Asia. Presented within press conference remarks given on the island of Guam in 1969, Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" stated that, "problems of international security...would be increasingly handled by...the Asian nations themselves."⁶⁸ Provoking apprehensions that Washington might withdraw from its security arrangement with Japan, JDA Director, and future prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro composed a controversial defense white paper in 1970. Nakasone proclaimed the need for Japan to achieve a degree of "military autonomy" that would ensure its safety in the event of an attack by the communists.⁶⁹ Designed to curb American protests that Japan was enjoying a "free ride," the white paper was prematurely introduced to a Japanese society still focused on economic growth. It spawned a

⁶⁵ Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, 20-23.

⁶⁶ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 344.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 346-347.

⁶⁸ Shibusawa, *Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change*, 49.

⁶⁹ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 239.

storm of protests against militarization and ended the Defense Agency's public release of policy until 1976.

Japan-U.S. relations grew even more strained as a result of the so-called "Nixon shocks."⁷⁰ In 1971, Nixon announced his intent to normalize relations between China and the United States. Shortly after, in response to domestic economic crises, he declared the abandonment of the gold standard. Coming so soon after the "Guam Doctrine," these policy decisions radically affected the strategic and economic plans Japan had depended upon for years. Furthermore, it gave rise to feelings that the United States was acting purely on its own and disregarding Japanese interests and security concerns. Finally, in 1972, some sense of rapprochement was reached by the long-awaited conversion of Okinawa from American to Japanese rule.⁷¹

2. New Assertiveness

From 1973 to 1989, Japan finally realized all of the hopes of the Meiji era and attained the status of an economic superpower. With this new power also came questions concerning how it was to be used. While the policies of the Yoshida Doctrine and the income doubling plans created a foundation for achieving success, they said little about what to do once power had been achieved.⁷² Although Japan had attained all of the original American expectations of a "free market fortress" in Asia, this achievement brought with it new difficulties for the country to confront.

The year 1973 marked a decisive turning point for Japan due to the dramatic impact of the October Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent "oil shocks" it produced.⁷³ Mainly because of its association with the United States, Japan was deemed an "unfriendly" state by the oil-producing Arab states of OPEC. This led to increased oil prices, reduced supply, and a shattering of all the foundations for future economic growth Japanese leaders had planned.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 352-358.

⁷¹ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 240.

⁷² Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, 861.

⁷³ Karasawa Kei, "Japan and Petroleum, the Most Critical Natural Resource," ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan's Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 70-71.

⁷⁴ LeFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*, 360-363.

Since, during this time, Japan depended on the region for nearly 80 percent of its oil imports, the striking rise in consumer and industrial costs associated with oil largely caused the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet and a shift in Japanese foreign policy. Japan's leaders quickly realized that they could not solely rely upon U.S. leadership for solving their external economic problems. Therefore, Japan began to conduct foreign relations more unilaterally to protect its interests. This new assertiveness began with Tokyo's recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in conjunction with Israel in 1973.

Other major events during this period propelled Japan's movement toward a more independent military policy. First, from 1976 to 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo launched a new foreign policy strategy later dubbed the "Fukuda Doctrine."⁷⁵ Generally, this view of diplomacy as an essential function of economic nourishment represented the growing strength of the neomercantilist view in Japanese politics. Furthermore, the concept of "omni-directional" diplomacy it described permitted Japan great flexibility in dealing with its problems.⁷⁶ As a result, the second and third oil shocks of mid-1979 and early 1980 found Japan more well-prepared resulting in less negative economic impact. Japan's thrust into the international arena found further expression in the 1980 statement of Foreign Minister Okita Saburo. He stated that Japan needed to end its practice of "passive" foreign diplomacy and to participate in influencing the development of global conditions rather than merely reacting to them.⁷⁷ This attitude was evidenced shortly after as Japan became one of the first world powers to receive PLO leader Yasser Arafat as a head of state in 1981.

Aside from purely diplomatic changes, Japan also began to concretely transform its national defense policies. Fearing an American withdrawal in Asia following the debacle of the Vietnam War, Japanese leaders sought greater self-sufficiency and latitude in providing for Japan's protection. Under Prime Minister Fukuda, in 1976 the JDA released the first defense white paper since the fiasco caused by Nakasone in 1970. "The National Defense Program Outline" (NDPO) of 1976 authorized an upper limit on military spending at one percent of the

⁷⁵ Ibid., 367.

⁷⁶ Edward A. Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 10.

⁷⁷ Michael G. L'Estrange, *The Internationalization of Japan's Military policy: Challenges and Dilemmas for a Reluctant Power*, (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1990), 3.

national GDP while encouraging technological improvements to the military. Additionally, it detailed the basic overall strength of the Self-Defense Forces and formed the basis of modern Japanese defense policies.⁷⁸ This demonstration of renewed interest in Japan's security came about largely as a result of government embarrassment surrounding the defection of a Soviet pilot who had flown his MIG-25 easily through Japanese air defenses to land in Hokkaido the same year.⁷⁹ Japanese leaders came under political pressure to rebuild the prestige of the JSDF as a viable deterrent to Soviet threats.

Four years later, in 1980, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi announced the adoption of "comprehensive security." This new policy called for a three-tiered approach to Japanese security and international relations. The first approach sought to promote international arms control, free trade, and improved north-south geopolitical relations. The second approach, called for strengthening ties to Japan's allies through increased diplomatic and economic cooperation. The final approach, advocated improvement of military capabilities, food security and the enhancement of economic productivity and export competitiveness.⁸⁰ Japanese leaders had witnessed increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the invasion of Afghanistan, troop deployments to the Northern Territories and northeast Asia, and the shooting down of a Korean airliner by Soviet fighters. They questioned whether the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union had changed for the worse.⁸¹

Comprehensive security attained great stature in the 1980s under the direction of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and the hawkish Nakasone Yasuhiro. Additionally, relations between Japan and the United States grew stronger toward achieving the final defeat of the Soviet Union. Initially, the weakness of the arrangement was evidenced in 1981 when the Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko made a public statement referring to Japan's "alliance" with the

⁷⁸ See *Defense of Japan 1996*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1996), p. 271

⁷⁹ Shibusawa, *Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change*, 95.

⁸⁰ Summarized from Peter J. Katzenstein and Okawara Nobuo, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993), 139-199 and Michael G. L'Estrange, *The Internationalization of Japan's Military policy: Challenges and Dilemmas for a Reluctant Power*, 16-20.

⁸¹ See Mike Mochizuki's chapter on Japan in ed. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), 119-120.

United States. After arousing a domestic storm of protest at the implications of his terminology, Suzuki quickly engaged in double-talk and claimed that his words had been misconstrued and misinterpreted.⁸² At the same time, he placated Washington by declaring that the JSDF would assume security responsibilities for Japan's sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) to an outer limit of 1000 nautical miles. Accordingly, he increased participation of the JSDF within numerous joint exercises with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

Even in the face of domestic criticisms, Japanese leaders began to actively contribute to improving regional security against the Soviet menace.⁸³ In doing so, these leaders extensively utilized the practice of *gaiatsu*, or outside pressure, as a ploy to defend unpopular actions. By describing their decisions as unavoidable due to outside forces (i.e. American demands), they absolved themselves of responsibility and directed public unhappiness away from Tokyo and overseas.⁸⁴

The concurrent ascension of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and President Ronald Reagan permitted the greatest advances in military cooperation to take place. Quickly forging a close personal connection, the relationship between the two leaders was quickly dubbed the "Ron-Yasu" alliance.⁸⁵ As tensions in the Middle East demanded more of Washington's attention, Reagan relied more heavily upon Nakasone to assist in providing regional security in East Asia. In addition, efforts were made to tie Japan into the U.S.-European alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by encouraging greater Japanese-European cooperative measures. This was seen as forming the third side of an equilateral triangle in the anti-Soviet alliance. Organizations such as the unofficial, but influential, Trilateral Commission started in 1973 and the Asian-European Group fostered this relationship.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Japan's naval assistance in tracking Soviet submarines became indispensable. Finally, significant military research partnerships were achieved in the form of an exchange of

⁸² Olsen, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View*, 23-26.

⁸³ Ibid., 95.

⁸⁴ Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, 33.

⁸⁵ Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-1990*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 144.

⁸⁶ Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 31.

technology agreement in 1983 and a similar agreement concerning joint research into Strategic Defense Initiative potential.⁸⁷

President Reagan's overall enthusiasm for the relationship was expressed during one of the first speeches of his second term on January 2, 1985. In this speech, he stated: "There is no relationship more important to peace and prosperity in the world than that between the United States and Japan."

C. AN UNCERTAIN POWER (1989 – 2002)

1. The Turbulent 1990s

1989 was a year of momentous change in Japan, and the world as a whole, heralding a decade of uncertainty and transformations. In a period of time, Japan experienced the death of Emperor Hirohito, witnessed the Tiananmen Square tragedy in China, and saw the beginning collapse of the bipolar world order that had shaped its patterns of success for nearly forty years. All of this resulted in social reordering, economic turmoil, and political turbulence and left many Japanese wondering what could possibly happen next. A condensation of these changes demonstrates how Japan yet again undertook a search for its identity and military security in the post-Cold War years.

During the 1990s, a variety of external forces acted to shape Japan's perception of its security environment. Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Japan continued to see itself as surrounded by potential adversaries.⁸⁸ Accordingly, it did not pursue a "peace dividend" to the extent that the United States and other Cold War combatants did. Whereas evidence could be found to confirm its suspicions, Japan's retention of a powerful military occurred mainly due to bureaucratic entrenchment and an aversion to dismantling the expensive and high-tech military force that had been created.⁸⁹ The perception of regional threats from China and North Korea began to take the place of the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, several dramatic alterations to Japanese military policy occurred during the 1990s. Most noteworthy was the first authorization for deploying forces overseas in

⁸⁷ L'Estrange, *The Internationalization of Japan's Military policy: Challenges and Dilemmas for a Reluctant Power*, 18-19.

⁸⁸ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: the Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, 280.

support of United Nations peacekeeping operations and, later, U.S.-led coalition military actions. These changes signified a greater willingness by Japan to involve itself directly in shaping world events.

The seeds of this process were sown in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1990-91). Japan was stung bitterly by the harsh international criticism it received concerning its role in the war. Specifically, “the slow, indecisive, and ultimately weak efforts by [Prime Minister] Kaifu’s cabinet to play a responsible role in connection with the United States were a disappointment to many of Japan’s friends abroad.”⁹⁰ One proposal in 1991 called for the creation of a “Peacekeeping Operations Co-Operation Corps” separate from the JSDF and thus less restricted by the Constitution. This initiative quickly stalled, however, because of opposition by JSDF leadership and political infighting.⁹¹

In the end, Japan eventually contributed over \$13 billion to the war effort and sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after hostilities had ceased. These actions, often characterized as “too little, too late,” gained little international recognition for Japan. Japanese leaders realized that in order to earn international respect, they could no longer rely upon “checkbook diplomacy.”⁹² Moreover, Japan’s noticeable absence from the 1992 coalition victory parade in New York City “left a deep scar upon the [Japanese] psyche.”⁹³ Intense debates surfaced in Japan concerning military policy resulting in the first serious discussions of constitutional reforms to permit overseas Japanese military activities.

In June 1992, with great difficulties, the Japanese Diet repealed the 1954 “Ban on Overseas Dispatch” and enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (also known as the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law). This legislation enabled the Japan to dispatch military personnel overseas for the first time since 1945. However, it limited the participation of Japanese Self-Defense Forces to logistical or “rear area” aspects of international peacekeeping operations (PKO). It stipulated that legislative approval of the Diet must occur

⁸⁹ Ibid., 280-283.

⁹⁰ Buckley, *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-1990*, 152.

⁹¹ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan’s Military Forces*, 286-87.

⁹² Francis Fukuyama and Oh Kongdan, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 16-17.

⁹³ Snitch, Thomas H. “Japan must take stand on Iraq,” *The Daily Yomiuri Online*. September 1, 2002 [Online] at < <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.html> > [1 September 2002].

before the Prime Minister may deploy the JSDF and limits the length of any such deployment to two years. Moreover, it established five restrictive prerequisites governing these potential deployments:⁹⁴

1. A cease-fire must be in place.
2. The parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operations.
3. The activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner.
4. Participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied.
5. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel.

Since the passage of this legislation, Japanese military personnel have participated in peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Zaire, and the Golan Heights.⁹⁵

In March 1994, troubled by a cool relationship with the United States and the threat of regional crises erupting in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula, Prime Minister Hosokawa ordered a comprehensive defense review. Five months later an advisory group published “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century.”⁹⁶ In this report, the advisory group strongly recommended “Japan should extricate itself from its military policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order.”⁹⁷ The report also recommended various improvements to the JSDF including streamlining units of the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) toward optimal use in future PKO missions. The report also criticized the disinterest

⁹⁴ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Online] at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp>> [28 August 2002].

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ The full text of this report can be found as an appendix to Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green’s McNair Paper 31 titled *Redefining the U.S. Japan-Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program*, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 1994)

⁹⁷ Ibid., 30.

of Japanese academia regarding security matters and the general apathy of Japanese youth concerning national defense. It warned:⁹⁸

If the whole society forgets to pay due respect to those who are engaged in the defense of the country, the spiritual foundation of national defense and security will be lost. History shows that such states did not enjoy lasting prosperity.

The Hosokawa report had an electric effect upon both Japanese and American policy. Furthermore, its release coincided with the publishing of conservative politician Ozawa Ichiro's "Blueprint for a New Japan." In this treatise, Ozawa called for Japan to become a "normal nation," revise its constitution, and exercise greater autonomy in its military and foreign policies.⁹⁹ In response, beginning in October 1994, the United States launched an intensive bilateral review of the security relationship, later termed the "Nye Initiative." The review lasted seven months and brought about significant changes to Japanese military policy.¹⁰⁰ In November 1995, the Japan's government revised the outdated 1976 NDPO and expanded the scope of Japanese defense responsibilities not only to resist an invasion of Japan itself, but also to respond to aggression in the geographically vague "areas surrounding Japan." Further steps were taken in April 1996 with the "Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for 21st Century" and the September 1997 establishment of "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" between the Japan and the United States.¹⁰¹ The "Guidelines" filled in many gaps that had previously existed in the Japan-U.S. military alliance strategy. In particular, this legislation permitted the emergency use of Japanese military bases by American forces and provided for increased Japanese involvement in keeping the sea lines of communication to Japan open.¹⁰²

In recent years, Japan accomplished significant improvements in streamlining the SDF command system and its interoperability with U.S. forces. First, in 1999, the Japanese Diet formally ratified the Guidelines Legislation. Also, amendments revising Japan's defense

⁹⁸ Ibid., 55.

⁹⁹ Richard B. Finn, "Japan's Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security", ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan's Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 123-124.

¹⁰⁰ The "Nye Initiative" and its effects are fully covered in Funabashi Yoichi *Alliance Adrift*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 248-276.

¹⁰¹ The full text of these agreements can be found on the Japanese Defense Agency website [Online] at <<http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html>> [28 August 2002].

¹⁰² NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2000*, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000), 121.

agency establishment law advanced SDF interservice cooperation and crisis response capabilities.¹⁰³ The Diet additionally passed the “Regional Contingency Law” permitting JSDF support of U.S. forces in disputes or emergencies near Japan. As a final point, on September 11, 2000, Japan established a “Bilateral Coordination Mechanism” with the United States. This organization set out “to coordinate the activities of the Japanese and U.S. governments in the event of an armed attack on Japan and in case of situations in areas surrounding Japan.”¹⁰⁴ Overall, it is clear from these developments that since the end of the Cold War, Japan achieved increased latitude in the use of its military forces while at the same time affirming the crucial role of the Japan-U.S. alliance to its overall national defense strategy.

2. Japan and September 11

Dramatic developments in Japan’s military policy transpired in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. First, fearing that Japan might repeat its foreign policy mistakes of the Gulf War, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage urged Japan to “show the flag” and make “visible forms of participation” in the mounting war on terrorism.¹⁰⁵ Although his words sparked criticism in the Japanese press, Prime Minister Koizumi affirmed Japan’s strong support for the impending American military campaign. On September 19, he unveiled a seven-point plan that aptly demonstrated Japan’s comprehensive security philosophy. The measures included:¹⁰⁶

1. The provision of logistical support for the U.S. military in the case of a retaliatory strike
2. Strengthened security around U.S. facilities in Japan

¹⁰³ Ota Fumio, “Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 2000-01, 59.

¹⁰⁴ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*. [Online]. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp>> [16 August 2002].

¹⁰⁵ “Japan’s Prime Minister Pledges Support for American Retaliation,” *The New York Times*, September 20, 2001, B4.

¹⁰⁶ Brad Glosserman, “Japan Battles Gulf War Ghosts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Pacific Forum, PacNet Newsletter, #38 September 28, 2001 [Online] at <<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0138.html>> [16 August 2002].

3. The dispatch of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships for supply and intelligence gathering missions
4. Measures to strengthen international cooperation.
5. Promise to provide SDF assistance to displaced peoples
6. \$40 million in emergency humanitarian and economic aid to countries in the region including Pakistan and India
7. Cooperation with other governments to ensure there is no confusion in the international economy

Koizumi also promised to enact emergency legislation that would allow Japan to take these steps. Following the military response of the United States against Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, on October 29, 2001 the Japanese government enacted the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.” This law enabled Japan to:¹⁰⁷

contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan itself, through such activities as (a) cooperation and support activities for the armed forces of the United States and other countries, which aim to eradicate the threat of the terrorist attacks, (b) search and rescue activities for such foreign forces, and (c) relief activities for affected people.

Shortly after, Japan deployed six MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led coalition. Additionally, elements of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) began assisting the United States in transportation roles in the western Pacific. On December 7, 2001, the Japanese Diet amended the 1992 PKO Law to give JSDF units involved in such operations greater flexibility in “monitoring cease-fires, disarming local forces, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting transport of weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons.”¹⁰⁸ More than any actions previously taken by Japan in the international arena, the support given to this effort laid the groundwork for greater Japanese involvement in shaping world events.

¹⁰⁷ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at [Online] <<http://www.mofa.go.jp>> [28 August 2002]

¹⁰⁸ Christopher A. McNally and Charles E. Morrison, eds., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2002*, (New

Other notable policy shifts occurred since then. In April 2002, the Japanese Cabinet Japan ratified its “Law to Respond to Armed Attacks” in reaction to the perceived mishandling of a December 2001 JMSA interception of a suspected North Korean spy ship. During the intercept, which involved 20 Japanese ships and 14 aircraft, a shootout ensued and the suspected ship was sunk. In March 1999, a similar incident had occurred marking the first occasion that the Japanese military had fired shots in anger since 1945. The new law calls for immediate MSDF response to any vessel suspected of being an armed spy ship. Previously, such matters had been the sole responsibility of the JMSA.¹⁰⁹ The Koizumi Cabinet also forwarded two additional bills to the Diet that included measures to adjust the seating of Japan’s Security Council and to provide additional powers to the office of the Prime Minister and SDF officers in times of crisis.¹¹⁰ These bills, together with those enacted in the aftermath of September 11, represent the most attention Japan has given to military issues in many years.

D. SUMMARY

The preceding history of Japanese military policy evolution yields many important facts. Among these are trends indicating Japan is moving in the direction of greater military flexibility and proactive internationalism. During the early years of the Cold War, Japan focused almost solely on economic growth and recovery while only reluctantly succumbing to American pressures to provide for its own defense. When Japan achieved economic power in the 1970s, its military policy became even more connected to the other two pillars of the comprehensive security triad: diplomacy and trade. This forced wider the gap between Japanese and American views of the alliance. Later, Soviet, then Chinese and North Korean security threats prompted Japan to assert itself more in the military arena. These actions brought the nation into greater harmony with American global defense strategies and greatly strengthened the alliance in the 1990s.

With the advent of the War on Terrorism, Japan received a momentous opportunity to reform its military policy and embark on a renewed path toward becoming a “normal nation.” Indeed, the feelings of many Japanese regarding these new directions in their nation’s military

York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002), 96.

¹⁰⁹ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – “China and Northeast Asia, Navy, Japan,” [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

policy was captured in the words of Okazaki Hisahiko, a career diplomat and elder statesman, who stated:

Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels are – at long last – operating in the Indian Ocean, each flying the Japanese naval flag, the Rising Sun...

...It took fantastically a long period of time, long enough to be chronicled at great length, to see this simple thing materialize.

Looking back, I cannot help but feel chagrined at this country for having missed one opportunity after another to send SDF troops abroad in the decades after World War II.¹¹¹

Conversely, despite the prospect of finally breaking with the past, great opposition still exists in Japan concerning any active role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces abroad. Therefore, the thesis turns now to the substance of this current debate over Japan's future military policy.

¹¹¹ Okazaki Hisahiko, "Dispatch of MSDF Vessels Historic, But Only First Step," *Daily Yomuri*, November 26, 2001, [Online] at <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/sdfdisp112601amb.html>> [27 August 2002].

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. JAPAN'S CONTEMPORARY MILITARY POLICY DEBATE

A. CRITICAL ISSUES

Japan's contemporary military policy debate is centered on three key issues: constitutional revision (especially Article 9), the right of collective defense, and the use of force by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Before any future policies can be considered, Japan must fully come to grips with each of these issues.

1. Constitutional Revision

Japan's current constitution contains numerous obstacles that hinder the nation's successful achievement of its international security interests.¹¹² These obstacles include its inability to address social and technological advances as well as the simple fact that it is not a "Japanese" constitution, having been originally composed in English and then imperfectly translated into Japanese. The Constitution reflects too many characteristics of a bygone era, especially with regard to Japanese military policy.

Over the years, no issue has provoked more controversy than proposals to revise or abolish Article 9. During the Cold War, these debates centered upon the legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces. On many occasions, the political left opposed the government and proclaimed that the very existence of the SDF was unconstitutional. Moreover, in keeping with Japan's general abhorrence to judicial activism, the Japanese Supreme Court exacerbated matters by avoiding the matter altogether. In the face of great criticism, the Court adopted the stance that issues pertaining to the SDF are "a fundamental problem of national administration that has the highest political character, so is not a subject for our legal review."¹¹³ Ultra-nationalists were equally unnerved by this lassitude. In November 1970, Japanese society was rocked by the spectacular suicide of celebrated author Mishima Yukio. From a balcony of the Tokyo SDF Headquarters, he called for the SDF to execute a "military coup" and to demand revision of the

¹¹² The proceeding of this debate can be found on the Japanese Diet website [Online] at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/> [1 September 2002].

¹¹³ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, 89.

Constitution. After being jeered and laughed at by crowds of SDF personnel who had gathered beneath him, he committed *hara-kiri* “ritual suicide” in the JDA Director’s office.¹¹⁴

Today, the JSDF is recognized as a legitimate arm of the government, however the limits on its use remain strongly contested. Since the passage of the 1992 PKO Bill, these debates have become increasingly heated. Thomas Berger described the current situation as follows:¹¹⁵

Japanese society possesses a “conviction that the armed forces are a potential threat to democracy that must be isolated and carefully constrained by civilian authorities. Thus, even when one of these safeguards is dropped or altered, it is invariably replaced by a new policy whose underlying objective-to contain the military-is much the same. Try as one might, one can find no requirement in the laws governing the Self-Defense Forces that such an endless succession of brakes be imposed. Yet the existence of such practices is itself one of the primary handicaps under which Japanese defense planners have to labor. The safeguards are symptoms, not the cause, of Japan’s culture of antimilitarism.

Like a hydra, each time constitutional restrictions are relaxed to permit greater flexibility for the SDF, a multitude of new legal limitations are created. Emergency legislation with titles like “peacekeeping cooperation laws” or “special anti-terrorism measures” continues to avoid the underlying constitutional dilemma.

Hopeful prospects for effective constitutional revision began on January 20, 2000.¹¹⁶ For the first time, the Japanese government established a “Research Commission on the Constitution.” This body has involved members of the Diet in consultations with a broad base of Japanese citizens from academics to homemakers. Although many constitutional issues are being addressed, Article 9 has received the most attention. This has been especially evident since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Overall, this development indicates that concrete steps are being taken to address the constitution’s many problems. In turn, this will empower Japan with greater flexibility in achieving its international security interests.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 150-55.

¹¹⁵ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 204-205.

¹¹⁶ Japanese Diet website [Online] <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english> [1 September 2002].

2. Collective Defense

Beyond the broader problems of Article 9, a significant barrier to increased SDF activity lies in the Japanese interpretation of collective defense. The concept of collective defense arose in Article 51 of the UN Charter that states:¹¹⁷

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Hence, although the Charter prohibits the use of force to settle disputes, “it endorses the use of force by the United Nations and by its members to exercise their inherent right of individual or collective defense.”¹¹⁸

Contrary to this, the Japanese government denies itself the right to collective defense. In most military alliances, an attack on one member constitutes an attack on all who are party to the alliance. At the present time, Japan’s only military ally is the United States. In this arrangement, however, Japan’s rejection of collective security means that even if the United States is attacked, Japan is not obligated to come to its ally’s defense. The Japanese government’s current official position on this issue is:¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ From the United Nations Charter [Online] at <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>> [16 September 2002].

¹¹⁸ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 314.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 315.

It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when that state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore self-evident that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law. The Japanese government nevertheless takes the view that the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country. The government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution.

In other words, as stated by Okazaki Hisahiko, “Japan has the right to collective defense, but it is a right that Japan will not exercise.”¹²⁰

Japan’s rejection of collective self-defense hinders its military relationships with foreign countries. Foremost, this rejection places it in violation of 1995 UN “Guidelines on Peacekeeping Operations” that declare participants in PKO must come to each other’s defense.¹²¹ Furthermore, this situation has produced numerous scenarios that call into question how far Japan will take this rejection of collective defense.¹²² For example, under the current view, a ballistic missile launched from the Asian mainland toward the United States could not be engaged by Japanese air defense systems even if they were the only assets capable of intercepting it. Such scenarios work against Japanese involvement in multinational coalitions since other nations’ militaries are reluctant to depend upon Japanese forces for their common defense.

As a final point, the issue of collective self-defense is currently under intense scrutiny in the Japanese government.¹²³ Immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, NATO invoked its commitment to collective self-defense for the first time in its history. Great Britain, Italy, Turkey, and Germany all offered the United States military support under this

¹²⁰ Larry M. Wortzel, “Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan’s New Law Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1500, November 5, 2001 [Online] at <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/BG1500.cfm>> [2 September 2002].

¹²¹ United Nations, *General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, 1995*, [Online] at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/training_material/training_material_home.html> [9 September 2002].

¹²² NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 319.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 315.

resolution, while Japan could not do likewise. This development spurred increased discussion over the issue of collective defense in the Japanese government.

3. Use of Force

Under its constitutional restraints, the JSDF is severely restricted in its use of force. Current PKO legislation directs that SDF personnel may only use weapons for “minimum self-defense purposes.”¹²⁴ This causes further difficulties when combined with stringent rules of engagement. Anticipatory self-defense has also been an extremely divisive subject, especially after North Korean missile tests and in reference to possible North Korean development of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, Japanese policy prohibits it from being an “integral part of the use of force” by other nations.¹²⁵ This means that Japan may not provide weapons, ammunition, or other war materiel to any units currently involved in or intending to participate in combat. The debate is still ongoing whether or not this prohibition applies to the fueling of U.S. warships in a rear area as occurred in the initial stages of operations in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Overall, these three critical issues present a considerable conundrum to Japanese military policy makers. Much evidence supports Berger’s conclusion that:¹²⁶

Japan’s unwillingness or inability to respond to military security threats is much greater than is assumed by those who believe that their behavior is merely the consequence of the free ride on security [it] receives from the United States. This, of course, makes the problem of achieving an equitable sharing of the burden of international security far more intractable.

B. JAPAN IN 2002

1. Political Situation

Substantial political reorganization occurred between 1989 and 2002 with prospects to continue into the future.¹²⁷ Foremost, the death of Emperor Hirohito on January 7, 1989

¹²⁴ Ibid., 317.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 317.

¹²⁶ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 209.

¹²⁷ Louis D. Hayes’ *Introduction to Japanese Politics* offers a comprehensive insight into the complexities of the Japanese political system.

marked the passing of the Showa era and the demise of one of the last remaining symbols of the World War Two period. The ascendancy of Akihito to the throne the following year witnessed Japan's entry into the Heisei era, or "Achieving Peace." Vigorous, liberal-minded, and western-educated, Akihito gained attention for his open interaction with the Japanese people and his rebelliousness against restrictions imposed upon him by the Kunaicho (Imperial Household Agency). He represented a breath of fresh air to many Japanese.¹²⁸

In 1993, the relatively unchallenged rule of the LDP ended after 38 years with the election of Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro. To a great extent, this occurred due to electoral reforms that expanded the ability of rival parties to gain seats in the Diet. Subsequent frequent shifts in government control caused many to believe that either Japan was truly becoming a multiparty democracy or that it would fall into the Italian habit of "revolving door" governments unable to act before they were replaced.¹²⁹ Also during this time, women began to hold unprecedented positions of authority in society and the government. The current National Diet shows women controlling nearly 16 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and seven percent in the House of Councilors.¹³⁰

Another important characteristic of this period was the rise in Japan of the "new right." These nationalists called for rearming Japan, abolishing or modifying the U.S. security treaty, and enabling Japan to become a "normal" country once more. Criticisms of Japan's dependence on the United States for protection caused some Japanese commentators to exclaim that, "putting political pressure on Japan [is] like twisting the arm of a baby."¹³¹

Owing to tremendous political infighting, Japan's government has largely been unable to effectively address foreign policy and military issues.¹³² In 2002, the current government is confronted by a gridlock of competing political factors. Among these are party interests, public pressures, excessive bureaucratic power, and the problematic nature of Japanese consensus-based decision making.

¹²⁸ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 280.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 285.

¹³⁰ Percentages of women in government taken from the Japanese House of Representatives website [Online] at <<http://www.shugiin.go.jp/eng/>> and the House of Councilors website [Online] at <<http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/>> [31 August 2002].

¹³¹ Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, Revised Edition*, 873-74.

¹³² Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 45-47.

a. Party Interests

Despite its relative loss of power, the LDP remains the most influential and popular political party in Japan.¹³³ The LDP is largely non-ideological and, unlike American political parties, is divided by a number of competing factions. As the former guardians of the “1955 system,” the LDP tends to be politically conservative in its outlook. LDP politicians continue to be closely connected to business interests that support their campaigns and expect legislative compensation in return. In recent years, however, economic problems in Japan limited the LDP from dispensing such boons causing a decline in its power.¹³⁴ The Japanese people traditionally tolerated this system of graft within the LDP as being a necessary function of politics and as long as local districts benefited from the national “pork” it produced. However, recent scandals within the LDP demonstrated that many of its politicians were abusing their positions for personal financial aggrandizement. Public uproar against these scandals has weakened the popular support for the LDP in recent elections.¹³⁵ In general, the LDP receives its greatest support from heavy industry and Japan’s agricultural and construction sectors.

The LDP is split in its opinions concerning SDF involvement in overseas military actions.¹³⁶ Former LDP Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi stridently opposed SDF dispatch during the Gulf War even if commissioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Others, including Koizumi, have proposed constitutional changes to Japan’s military policy. In his initial political campaign, Koizumi expressed wariness of Japan actually achieving a permanent seat on UN Security Council owing to the military responsibilities it might entail. Later, however, he called for constitutional revision and that the SDF be properly called a military.¹³⁷ Still other major LDP leaders, such as Ozawa Ichiro, left the LDP altogether to form new parties that better express their different conservative perspectives. As

¹³³ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 80-82.

¹³⁴ William H. Overholt, “Japan’s Economy, at War With Itself,” *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2002, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press), 142.

¹³⁵ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 115-116.

¹³⁶ Okubo Shiro, “Japan’s Constitutional Pacifism and United Nations Peacekeeping,” ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan’s Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 106-108.

¹³⁷ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – “China and Northeast Asia, Japan” [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

of August 2002, the LDP held 50.5 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives (Lower House) and 47 percent in the House of Councilors (Upper House).¹³⁸

The primary opposition party to the LDP is the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ rose in power in 1998 by absorbing the members of a variety of smaller parties. These included the New Frontier Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Harbinger Party, and the Japan New Party.¹³⁹ On the whole, the DPJ represents those disaffected with LDP leadership but who also do not adhere to radical political philosophies. Kan Naoto, the party's first leader, attempted to define the DPJ's beliefs as encouraging government "decentralization, independence from the bureaucracy, and transparency."¹⁴⁰ Although such statements demonstrate an amorphous ideology like the LDP, its platforms tend to be more politically left of center. Various industrial and trade worker groups as well as middle class women and urban salarymen support the DPJ.¹⁴¹

The DPJ is divided in its views on how the SDF should be used internationally. Common themes include improving Japan's position in its dealings with the United States, adopting a UN-centered foreign policy, and emphasizing multilateral rather than autonomous security. Some have stressed "exclusively defense-oriented military doctrine" with use of the SDF governed by Diet passage of "emergency legislation."¹⁴² On the other hand, Yamada Toshimasa of the DPJ and Club of Independents recently declared, "our international cooperation will never be recognized as such overseas if we take the position that we cannot use armed forces because of constitutional restrictions."¹⁴³ The DPJ currently holds 26 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 24 percent in the House of Councilors.

¹³⁸ For the remainder of this section, percentages of party control within the Japanese government were taken from the Japanese House of Representatives website [Online] at <<http://www.shugiin.go.jp/eng>> and the House of Councilors website [Online] at <<http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/>> [31 August 2002].

¹³⁹ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 52.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 52.

¹⁴¹ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 109-110. Based upon social groups that previously supported the Japan New Party and the former Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).

¹⁴² Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* 52-53.

¹⁴³ Japanese Diet, Subcommittee on Japan's Role in International Society (First Meeting), 28 February 2002, [Online] at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/20020228isf.html> [1 September 2002].

The third largest political party in Japan is the New Komeito Party, or “Clean Government Party” (CGP). Also known simply as “the Komeito,” the CGP is the only major political party in Japan with a strongly religious ideology. The CGP receives its support from the Buddhist sect Sokagakkai, a contemporary offshoot of traditional Japanese nichiren Buddhism. CGP power increased greatly in the 1990s by aggressively proselytizing the public with its message of “fusing Buddhism with politics.”¹⁴⁴ This philosophy calls for ending government corruption, improving social welfare programs, and refocusing youth on traditional Japanese values. The party generally represents the dissatisfied and socially alienated in Japan including small shopkeepers, women, young people, unskilled workers, and those with limited education.

The CGP takes a better-defined stance on military issues than the LDP or the DPJ.¹⁴⁵ In keeping with its Buddhist philosophy, the CGP emphasizes pacifism, Asian multilateralism, nuclear disarmament, and the role of “soft power” in foreign policy.¹⁴⁶ However, its humanist doctrine also makes the CGP a strong supporter of Japanese involvement in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. These beliefs came to light during an August 27, 2002 confrontation between CGP General Secretary Fuyushiba Tetsuzo and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. In a frank discussion on the topic of Japan’s support for a potential American attack on Iraq, Fuyushiba all but characterized Armitage as bloodthirsty stating, “you should absolutely refrain from killing innocent people...violence by any country should be brought to an end in the name of the international community through procedures as provided by [UN Charter] Article 39.”¹⁴⁷ Overall, the CGP is opposed to the SDF becoming involved in a combat role but is very supportive of its use in non-combat missions. At present, the CGP controls 10 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 6.5 percent in the House of Councilors.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) is the oldest and most well defined ideological party in Japan. Founded in 1922, the JCP enjoyed close connections to Moscow

¹⁴⁴ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 106.

¹⁴⁵ The Clean Government Party maintains a website that details their Basic Policies [Online] at <http://www.komei.or.jp/komei_news/contents/english/menu/basicpolicy.html> [5 September 2002].

¹⁴⁶ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 54.

¹⁴⁷ Uemura Takeshi, “Political Pulse / Tempers Flare at Meeting with Armitage,” *Daily Yomiuri Online*, [Online] at <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20020904wo06.html>> [5 September 2002].

and Beijing for most of its history. In the 1990s, however, the JCP shifted its ideological base from the Chinese model to an Italian style that better reflected its nationalist orientation.¹⁴⁸ Over the years, the power of the JCP waxed and waned and today holds little attraction for most Japanese. To little effect, the JCP has attempted to raise public support by advocating world peace, denouncing the Japan-U.S. alliance and calling for the return of the Northern Territories from Russia in addition to its traditional demands for workers' rights. The JCP draws its support from radical students, intellectuals, and members of the peace movement.

The JCP holds strong antimilitary views regarding the SDF and its potential international role. It opposes any alteration to current constitutional restrictions on SDF activity and it was only in 2000 that the JCP even acknowledged the legality of the SDF's existence. The JCP has long been a critic and antagonist of LDP military policies, especially those that have brought Japan closer to the United States. Even in the aftermath of September 11, the JCP stridently opposed military action in Afghanistan with JCP leader Haruna Naoaki saying, "Japan should only make a non-military contribution" toward the war on terrorism.¹⁴⁹ The JCP holds 4 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 8 percent in the House of Councilors.

In 1998 Ozawa Ichiro formed the Liberal Party from members of his Japan Renewal Party that split from the LDP in 1993. The Liberal Party is highly conservative and possesses an articulate ideological platform that is second only to the JCP in its cohesion.¹⁵⁰ Its strength comes from its proactive philosophy that has drawn support from the LDP's political right.

The Liberal Party champions Ozawa's vision of Japan as a "normal nation" and concentrates on foreign policy and defense issues over domestic affairs. Its adherents call for constitutional revision, active and expanded SDF participation in UN PKO, and freedom for the SDF to use force under UN collective security guidelines. The Liberal Party's statement regarding the terrorist attacks on the United States reflects their view:

¹⁴⁸ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 109.

¹⁴⁹ Japanese Diet, Subcommittee on Japan's Role in International Society (First Meeting), 28 February 2002. Found [Online] at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/20020228isf.html> [1 September 2002].

¹⁵⁰ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 53.

The acts of terror that occurred in the United States are an affront to the ideals of freedom and democracy. We must respond resolutely to the terrorist threat. In particular, our country, which has in the past lacked resolve in the face of terrorist demands, needs to react with a new awareness and determination. However, the response of the current administration does not indicate that any decision has been made regarding the interpretation of the constitution in such circumstances. The steps proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi are nothing more than ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment half-measures. Such irresponsible politics endanger Japan and expose the Japanese people to an uncertain future. Our country must hasten to establish fundamental principles and structures in the areas of both national security and crisis management.¹⁵¹

The Liberal Party holds 4.6 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 3.2 percent in the House of Councilors.

The last major Japanese political party is the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP serves as the final remains of the previously strong Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which shattered in the 1990s after forming coalition governments with the LDP. For many years, the JSP acted as the strongest and most credible leftist opposition party in Japanese politics. The JSP's collusion with its previous political opponents destroyed the faith of its supporters, largely labor unions and working-class organizations. As a result, the DPJ absorbed many of these disaffected supporters and the Social Democratic Party's influence has been marginalized.

Like the JCP, the Social Democratic Party resists any increase in SDF activity and only recently even acquiesced to its legality. The most actively pacifistic members of the SDP promote the idea that Japan should utilize non-violent means of resistance in the event of a national emergency. This is reflected in SDP leader Oshima Reiko's statement to the Diet that the position of the SDP is to "pursue disarmament and reduce the size of the SDF while recognizing its existence."¹⁵² Internationally, the SDP favors humanitarian assistance only.

¹⁵¹ Taken from the Liberal Party website [Online] at <<http://www.jiyuto.or.jp/ENG>> [4 September 2002].

¹⁵² Japanese Diet, Subcommittee on Japan's Role in International Society (First Meeting), 28 February 2002, [Online] at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/20020228isf.html> [1 September 2002]

The SDP presently holds nearly 4 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives and 3 percent in the House of Councilors.

b. *Public Pressures*

The fractious nature of Japanese politics echoes comparable divisions within the Japanese public concerning national military policies. Japan's government is sensitive to public opinion and takes seriously the results of countless polls conducted by its media and think tanks. Furthermore, a cultural trait of Japanese society is its emphasis on belonging to social groups.¹⁵³ Many Japanese voice their political concerns through their membership in interest-oriented organizations rather than speaking out individually. Since the passage of the PKO bill in 1992, opinion polls have consistently confirmed Japanese public support for SDF involvement in UN PKO.¹⁵⁴ Even so, they remain sharply divided as to how this involvement should be executed.

Organized opposition to active SDF involvement comes mainly from groups that embrace leftist political ideologies, namely student groups, labor unions, and some press institutions. One of the most vocal student groups is the Zengakuren, the "All-Japan Students Self-Governing Association", which has close connections to the JCP and has long advocated the end of the Japan-U.S. treaty, the removal of American military forces from Japan, and decreased American military activity around the world.¹⁵⁵ This group is exceptional, however, and since the late 1960s such student activism has declined greatly. Most college-age Japanese are as politically apathetic as their counterparts throughout the world. Labor unions also often oppose SDF activity. One noteworthy example is Sohyo, "All-Japan Federation of Labor," that is composed of teachers, communications workers, and transportation workers. Sohyo was historically tied to the former JSP.¹⁵⁶ Even workers in defense industry unions express their anxiety over SDF activity by not actively pressuring the JDA on matters of procurement that

¹⁵³ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 164-166.

¹⁵⁴ Peter J. Woolley, *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*, (Boulder, CO: Rienner Publishers Inc., 2000), 144.

¹⁵⁵ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 153.

¹⁵⁶ Keddel, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, 95-96.

would benefit their own livelihood.¹⁵⁷ Overall, labor unions hold little political power apart from their financial support of left-wing politicians.¹⁵⁸ Finally, within the national press organizations, the daily newspapers *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Mainichi Shimbun* continue to remain critical of SDF activity and any proposals to modify national military policy.¹⁵⁹

More broadly, the peace movement and religious organizations also oppose active SDF involvement overseas. The Japanese peace movement draws supporters from all walks of life and is usually concerned with nuclear disarmament. Since the end of the Cold War, their strength has diminished considerably. Religious organizations also espouse pacifism on spiritual grounds. The disestablishment of state Shinto during the American occupation enabled many formerly lower profile Buddhist sects to reorganize and build followings. As a rule, however, Japanese pacifism is humanistic and lacks a religious foundation other than generalized Buddhist principles. Most Japanese today are secular, with Shinto and Buddhist influences found more in culture and art than in politics.¹⁶⁰ As has been previously noted, the Komeito is a unique exception.

On the other end of the spectrum stand a wide variety of organizations that support the active use of the SDF in overseas activities. The most prominent are numerous local SDF “support groups.” In 1993, Katzenstein and Okawara reported that these voluntary associations, SDF support groups, and other civic organizations mustered over 10 million members. Many members are politically conservative, although the majority seek to lobby the government on local issues concerning nearby base operations and other funding matters.¹⁶¹ Within the Japanese press, the newspapers *Sankei Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* generally support military activities.¹⁶² One example of this occurred in late 1994 when the *Yomiuri Shimbun* published an alternative constitution that declared the legality of the armed forces and empowered them with the ability to fully meet Japan’s international

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 63.

¹⁵⁸ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 144.

¹⁵⁹ Keddel, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, 194-195.

¹⁶⁰ Denise L. and John T. Carmody, *Eastern Ways to the Center: An Introduction to Asian Religions*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1983), 175.

¹⁶¹ Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 58-59.

¹⁶² Keddel, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, 194-195.

security requirements.¹⁶³ Lastly, a number of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Nihon Aikokuto (Japan Patriotic Party), “Black Dragons,” and the “Japan Youth Federation” also advocate for a greatly expanded SDF role in Japan. On the whole, however, these associations do more harm than good for their cause owing to their connections to *yakuza* organized crime interests and their virulent rhetoric that often calls for the restoration of the Imperial system and the expulsion of foreigners.

c. Bureaucratic Interests

The power of the bureaucracy within Japan’s government compounds the problems it faces regarding military policy. Under the “1955 system,” the composition of the bureaucracy remained relatively imperious to outside political change. In recent years, however, shifts in the makeup of the Diet and the Prime Minister’s office have increasingly affected its structure and power.¹⁶⁴ As a result, party fragmentation and divisive public opinion “weaken the ability of the government to act decisively... leaving most power to be exercised by the bureaucracy.”¹⁶⁵ One notable example of this excessive power is the fact that the Japanese bureaucracy controls about half of total government revenues free of restrictions or accountability to the Diet.¹⁶⁶

Such influence traditionally lessened the importance of military policy. In keeping with the concept of comprehensive security, military policy was only one small leg of the military policy tripod. Foremost were economic considerations, followed by diplomatic, and then military matters. This hierarchy reflected the standing of the relevant ministries within the government bureaucracy. When the government faced an issue of economic security, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)¹⁶⁷ took precedence, followed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). However, when an

¹⁶³ Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, 304.

¹⁶⁴ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 57.

¹⁶⁵ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 299.

¹⁶⁶ Overholt, “Japan’s Economy, at War With Itself,” 142.

¹⁶⁷ In 2000, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).

issue of military security arose, a similar chain of command formed, led by the MOF, MOFA, and then lastly the JDA in order of importance.¹⁶⁸

Clearly, this demonstrates the JDA's lack of stature among the other ministries.¹⁶⁹ The head of the JDA has always been a "director" rather than a full-fledged "minister." In addition, the JDA is usually required to fill a large number of its job vacancies with members of other ministries rather than by promoting from within. On the surface, this state of affairs represented the continued mistrust of the military by civilian authorities. As a result, the expertise of individuals familiar with military matters was typically not given free expression within the policy-making functions of the government.

During the 1990s, the status of the JDA improved. In 1997, many junior LDP politicians pushed for the Agency to be elevated to full Ministry status, a move welcomed by junior JDA bureaucrats. Surprisingly, the wariness and conservatism of senior JDA officials halted the reform plan.¹⁷⁰ Today, although it remains limited in its policy-making role, JDA influence is increasingly felt in foreign affairs decision-making. Michael Green ascribes this change to four factors:¹⁷¹

1. SDF contributions to UN PKO make high-visibility contributions to Japanese diplomatic efforts.
2. The JDA now acts as a primary conduit for managing alliance affairs with the United States.
3. Growing public awareness of threats to Japan's national security including regional missile tests and terrorist acts.
4. Increased technical expertise and information concerning military issues now exceeds that possessed by rival Ministries.

Overall, bureaucratic politics will continue to present challenges to the Japanese government in constructing an effective military policy.

¹⁶⁸ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, 106-107.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 107.

¹⁷⁰ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 64.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 63-64.

d. Decision-Making

The Japanese decision-making process also influences the development of military policy. There are over 126 million Japanese living in a total land area less than the size of Texas. Over the centuries, these crowded conditions created a cultural preference for consensus-based decision-making in which all affected parties are given a chance to voice their concerns.¹⁷² Directives and mandates from one individual are usually balked at. Henry Kissinger characterized this system saying, “A Japanese Prime Minister is the custodian of national consensus, not the creator of it.”¹⁷³ Kissinger goes on to say that this has been a major frustration of foreign leaders, especially the United States, when dealing with Japan. Adding to these problems is the Japanese tendency to preserve former leaders in unofficial roles such as “kingmaker” for their political parties. This “man behind the curtain” conservatism slows the introduction of new ideas into the political sphere. On the whole, the entire process is extraordinarily lengthy. Often, in the absence of an agreed upon consensus, Japanese leaders find it easier to make no decision at all. Such patterns reflect “a philosophy that if no decision is made, no one can be accused of doing anything wrong.”¹⁷⁴

Accordingly, given the previously demonstrated political divisiveness of military matters, consensus-based decisions on military policy are extremely difficult to arrive at. One attempt at an internal solution that arose during the 1980s was the development of various *zoku*, or “tribes” within the government.¹⁷⁵ The *zoku* lobby for their ministry’s interests by forming policy caucuses in the Diet. Initially, the defense *zoku* lacked the influence or backing possessed by other special interests such as the construction industry, agriculture, and trade. As a result, they often “solicited U.S. pressure on Japan to increase defense spending.”¹⁷⁶ Since the political shakeups of 1993, the defense *zoku* have enjoyed greater success. They played a key role in the construction of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and, in combination with foreign policy *zoku*, they fought for indigenous intelligence satellite

¹⁷² Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 7-9.

¹⁷³ Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 122.

¹⁷⁴ Snitch, “Japan must take stand on Iraq,” *The Daily Yomiuri Online*. September 1, 2002 [Online] at < <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.html> > [1 September 2002].

¹⁷⁵ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 48.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

capability in 1998. Overall, however, these initiatives demonstrated the energy of the junior politicians involved rather than sweeping changes to how military policy decisions are handled by the government.¹⁷⁷

On the other hand, *gaiatsu* – foreign pressure – has proven to be effective in forcing through changes to Japan’s military policy in the past, particularly by the United States. According to Hunsberger, “Without strong pressure from abroad, the Japanese consensus society has only limited capacity to make difficult choices or embark on new courses that involve painful change and disruption.”¹⁷⁸ He goes further to say that Japan has not demonstrated great leadership in the past and, rather than write the rules of international society, prefers to succeed within the systems set up by others. Despite its effectiveness, *gaiatsu* carries with it a high cost in political capital. It also often damages the prestige of the Japanese government with its constituents.

2. Economic Situation

Japan’s economy is beset by troubles and faces a highly uncertain future. Given the Japanese government’s long-standing focus on economic security over military security, this situation portends further difficulties toward effectively developing future national military policies.

The creation of a favorable economic environment, both at home and abroad, has always been a vital Japanese national interest.¹⁷⁹ Domestically, the pursuit of this interest encouraged the formation of strong bonds between Japan’s government, industry, and financial institutions. Japan’s economy benefited from its ability to direct government revenues toward investment in national infrastructure while devoting relatively minimal amounts to defense programs. Internationally, Japanese economic policies encouraged a high overseas demand for Japanese products. At the same time, Japan attempted to reduce foreign anxiety over the success of its exports through a wide range of investment and developmental assistance

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 50.

¹⁷⁸ Warren S. Hunsberger, ed., “Japan’s International Role: Past, Present, and Prospective,” *Japan’s Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 211.

¹⁷⁹ Kenneth Pyle and Eric Heginbotham, “Japan,” in *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose*. (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 75-76.

devices. Taken as a whole, Japan continues to follow a more regulated, directed, and unified economic strategy than many other advanced democracies.

After four decades of phenomenal growth, Japan's "bubble economy" burst in 1990. By 1993-1994, the country had entered its worst recession since 1945.¹⁸⁰ Later, in 1997, the collapse of the Thai baht produced a widespread Asian economic crisis that Japanese leadership proved ineffectual in combating. Many nations became concerned that Japan was impotent in influencing Asian economic affairs.¹⁸¹ Today, Japan's government debt exceeds its GDP in estimates ranging from 130 percent to 400 percent and its banks hold as much as \$2 trillion in non-performing loans.¹⁸² Japanese unemployment stands at a remarkable five percent. The government has tried to revitalize the economy through a variety of "stimulus packages" to little effect. Even Prime Minister Koizumi's ambitious restructuring and reform proposals have been inadequate to cope with these problems.¹⁸³

Thus, Japan faces a future of difficult economic choices. In a recent *Foreign Affairs* article titled "Japan's Economy, at War With Itself," economist William Overholt stated that Japan continues to possess an economy constructed along the wartime model of 1940, one that is very unsuited for the conditions of the 21st century.¹⁸⁴ He warned that if Japan continues to postpone fixing its economic problems, it could become engulfed in a crisis similar to "Weimar Germany."¹⁸⁵ Japanese economist Shimada Haruo echoes these woes and adds that globalization has added to Japan's economic miseries through the relocation of many industries from the high-cost environment of Japan to less expensive countries such as China.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, many Japanese believe that the nation will suffer economically in coming years owing to the nation's low birth rate and the increasingly higher costs of supporting an aging population.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁰ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 285-286.

¹⁸¹ Kozo Kato, *Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 35.

¹⁸² Overholt, "Japan's Economy, at War With Itself," 138-139.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁸⁶ Shimada Haruo, "The Koizumi Government and Demand-Generating Structural Reform," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Summer 2002, vol. 16, No. 2, (Japan Institute of International Affairs).

¹⁸⁷ NIDS, *Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, Council of Defense-Strategic Studies 1999-2000*. (Tokyo: NIDS, 2001), 21.

All of the news is not bad, however. On the positive side, Japan is the world's third largest producer of manufactured goods (after the United States and Germany). The products of its high-tech and automobile industries continue to be in high demand throughout the world.¹⁸⁸ If completed in a timely and efficient manner, reorganization and streamlining will preserve Japan's substantial economic power for a long time into the future.¹⁸⁹

The importance of economic issues gives civilian industries considerable influence over Japanese military policy. On a broad scale, civilian industrial, business, and financial institutions remain tightly interconnected through the *keiretsu* system. These networks possess vast resources used to lobby members of the government. Primary *keiretsu* conglomerates include Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa, which control roughly a fourth of all economic activity in Japan.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, nearly all large Japanese businesses, or *zakai*, belong to three influential organizations: Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), and Nihon Shoko Kaigisho (Japan Chamber of Commerce).¹⁹¹ Beyond their commercial usefulness, these associations serve as an outlet for *zakai* to express their political views concerning Japanese foreign and military policy. Keidanren is the largest and most influential organization of the three and is intimately involved in foreign and military policy formulation. The Keizai Doyukai, while divided in its views on military policy, has called for greater debate on Japanese military issues, especially expanding SDF participation in PKO as well as constitutional revision.¹⁹²

Although civilian and defense industries are inextricably linked together in Japan, emphasis on defense production is low. The Japanese defense industry comprises only 0.6 percent of national industrial production and employs only approximately 60,000 workers.¹⁹³ Even within Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Japan's largest defense contractor, defense-related

¹⁸⁸ Pyle and Heginbotham, "Japan," 75-76.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 75-76.

¹⁹⁰ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "Japan's Defence Industry – August 1998" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

¹⁹¹ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 64.

¹⁹² Ibid., 65-66.

¹⁹³ Kimura Soji and Matsuoka Hisao, "Prospect and Dilemma of the Defense Industry in Japan in the Post Cold-War Era Accommodation to Globalization of Economy," in *National Institute for Defense Studies Security Reports*, No. 2, March 2001, 22-23.

sales only comprised 15 percent of its overall earnings during the 1990s.¹⁹⁴ Similar ratios are found throughout the Japanese defense industry. The main reason for this can be found in Japan's policy not to export arms. Although Japan indigenously produces approximately 80 percent of its defense material and weaponry, the inability to export arms makes production lines short and very costly. Japan contracts the remainder of its armament needs from the United States and Europe. Defense industrialists have grumbled at these ratios but acquiesce to the political expediency of the arrangement.¹⁹⁵ Other reasons for limiting allocations to defense production include numerous recent procurement scandals, corporate restructuring, and a continued reliance on licensing designs from other countries, especially the United States.¹⁹⁶

The main interest of Japanese industry, like those in any country, is profit. This more than anything affects its stance on national military policy. One solution that is frequently utilized is the production of "dual-use" technologies. These are products not specifically built for military use but which can easily be adapted to military needs. Vehicles, computers, and many other items fit this category. Such dual-use products have become so diffused throughout Japanese industry that nearly all of the major *keiretsu* can be said to have a vital interest in defense budgets.¹⁹⁷ Dual-use also permits convenient political deniability of an industry's involvement in defense production. This reflects a continued sensitivity to public opinion and antimilitarist sentiment.¹⁹⁸

In sum, Japanese economic interests possess considerable influence over national military policy. Their purpose is to profit from the creation of stable domestic and international markets. They have a vested interest in the defense budget owing to dual-use production, but do not rely heavily on such contracts for their livelihood. They view changes to Japan's military policy in terms of how it might affect the "bottom line," at home and abroad.

¹⁹⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "Japan's Defence Industry – August 1998" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

¹⁹⁵ Wilborn, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?", 9.

¹⁹⁶ Kimura and Matsuoka, 33-34.

¹⁹⁷ Katzenstein and Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, 66-68.

¹⁹⁸ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 204.

3. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces

A full appreciation of Japan's current debate requires an examination of SDF capabilities, limitations, suitability for coalition operations, and its influence over military policy-making.¹⁹⁹ Since its official establishment in 1954, the SDF, *Jieitai*, has steadily improved its strength and capabilities despite great social and institutional resistance. The SDF musters a total strength of 235,300 volunteer personnel divided into three services: *Kaijo*, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), *Kuko*, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and *Rikujo*, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF).²⁰⁰ All three services are vigorously pursuing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies in addition to improving structural C⁴I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence) capabilities. Echoing developments in the United States military, the SDF is struggling to improve joint operations between its separate branches.

In keeping with principles of upholding civilian control, the SDF chain-of-command system limits its flexibility. The leaders of each service branch comprise a Joint Staff Council headed by the senior SDF officer. The chief of the Joint Staff Council reports to the JDA director general, not to the prime minister who is the nominal commander-in-chief. At this level, civilian political authorities closely control SDF operations through a multitude of legal mechanisms. The JDA Director is the only military representative on the prime minister's Security Council. The heads of other government ministries, including the Ministries of Trade and Finance, fill the remaining seats. In addition, the prime minister is required to secure Diet approval through a lengthy process prior to executing most military orders. In total, this system hinders effective command of the SDF, especially in times of crisis.

Throughout its history, the JSDF has been held in low regard by Japanese society at large. This was particularly true from the 1950s to the 1970s. Pay and benefits of SDF members did not favorably compare with those available in civilian industry and widespread student protests prevented SDF officers from pursuing graduate studies at big universities like

¹⁹⁹ Few comprehensive studies of the JSDF are available in English. This is likely because the JSDF has never engaged in combat and lacks the popular appeal of most military histories. Very useful and informative references include: James E. Auer, *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*, Maeda Tetsuo, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, and Peter J. Woolley, *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*.

²⁰⁰ Unless otherwise noted, facts presented in this section were drawn from Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

Tokyo University.²⁰¹ Moreover, military-related research and development was neglected in favor of purchases of technology from the United States.²⁰² Although the social status and personnel benefits of SDF members has improved somewhat in recent years, recruitment and retention remain a problem, especially within the officer ranks.²⁰³

a. Capabilities

Arguably the most capable service branch is the MSDF. The MSDF is comprised of 42,600 personnel who man the ships and aircraft of the third largest navy in the world.²⁰⁴ Naval assets include forty-one destroyers, eighteen submarines, twelve frigates, three missile-armed hydrofoils, and over thirty minesweepers. Of the forty-one destroyers, four are of the Kongou-class, which is equipped with the premier AEGIS combat system. In keeping with Japan's declared defensively oriented posture, MSDF warships do not possess a land-attack capability beyond short-range gun systems. On the other hand, these ships are equipped with the best anti-air and anti-ship missile systems available. There are no naval infantry in the MSDF force structure; however, in March 2001 Japan created a special tactics unit similar to the U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land Teams (SEALS). This new unit appears to be specifically designed for dealing with the capture of vessels intruding in Japan's territorial waters.²⁰⁵ Due to its seagoing nature, the MSDF has not participated in any UN peacekeeping operations. Instead, the MSDF continues to focus on traditional naval missions of sea control through extensive training in local waters.

Recent developments within the MSDF indicate promising future potential.²⁰⁶ The MSDF dedicates a substantial portion of its training regimen to anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare. In addition, the MSDF is extensively involved in Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) research and development and sees this as a primary mission for the future.

²⁰¹ Hoyt, *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*, 119.

²⁰² Kimura and Matsuoka, "Prospect and Dilemma of the Defense Industry in Japan in the Post Cold-War Era Accommodation to Globalization of Economy," 25-28.

²⁰³ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, 259-261.

²⁰⁴ In terms of gross naval tonnage.

²⁰⁵ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia, Navy, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002]

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Various designs of “light aircraft carriers” have been proposed during the 1990s that would carry small numbers of helicopters or fighter aircraft. This is hoped to extend the MSDF operational reach at sea. Also, proposals have been approved for construction of a large logistical ship to act in replenishing overseas GSDF deployed units. MSDF forces have been highly visible in the war on terrorism including convoy of the U.S. aircraft carrier *Kittyhawk* in September 2001, and refueling and intelligence gathering duties in the Indian Ocean.

Another critical element of the Japanese military is the ASDF.²⁰⁷ Approximately 44,200 personnel serve in the ASDF at a variety of airbases throughout Japan. The ASDF controls over 800 aircraft of which approximately 300 are multi-role fighters and interceptors. Among these combat aircraft are over 150 F-15J's, indigenously produced and highly capable interceptors. The ASDF is charged with defending the airspace over and around Japan and therefore also controls over 500 land-based surface-to-air missile systems.

The ASDF is beginning to assume a more active role in overall SDF operations. For many years, the ASDF conducted its mission in relative isolation from its sister services. During the 1990s, however, ASDF C-130 transport aircraft were used extensively to resupply and airlift personnel in Zaire and Rwanda during Japanese PKO. These same aircraft were used most recently for transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to Pakistan in November 2001. The ASDF also developed a new fighter aircraft designated the F-2A/B (also known as FS-X). At present, technical difficulties with the fighter's radar system have prevented it being fielded. Finally, in December 2000, the ASDF appropriated funding for four new tanker aircraft to permit in-air refueling of fighter aircraft to extend their operational range.

The GSDF is the largest component of the Japanese military.²⁰⁸ It comprises 148,500 personnel divided into five geographically oriented armies. The GSDF inventory includes over 1000 main battle tanks, 790 armored personnel carriers, over 900 heavy artillery pieces and wide range of anti-tank and air defense weapons. Notable in this order of battle are 150 highly regarded and indigenously developed Type-90 main battle tanks. GSDF doctrine is focused on defense of the Japanese home islands from potential Chinese or Russian invasion.

²⁰⁷ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – “China and Northeast Asia, Air Force, Japan” [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

²⁰⁸ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – “China and Northeast Asia, Army, Japan” [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

No offensive operational or tactical training occurs. The GSDF has long emphasized disaster relief operations, although it received great criticism in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake that caused 6336 deaths and injured nearly 35,000. Because of confusing chains of command and organization, it took the GSDF 14 hours to respond to the disaster.²⁰⁹ Overall, the GSDF is admirably equipped but suffers shortcomings in training and organization.

Despite its problems, the GSDF has been the most active service in overseas operations in recent years. GSDF deployed to Cambodia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights during the 1990s. In March 2002, Japan dispatched a 680-man GSDF civil engineering battalion to East Timor in support of UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). Since the passage of the 1992 PKO Act, Japan has vigorously worked to restructure its ground forces into smaller and more easily deployable brigades and divisions. Training has emphasized hostile environment survivability, foreign language and area instruction, as well as emphasizing disaster relief and other aspects of “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

Beyond the three formal services of the SDF, Japan also possesses a diverse array of other national security assets. Separate from the official SDF stands the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA). The JMSA is Japan’s Coast Guard and possesses over 517 ships and 70 aircraft that fulfill a wide range of coastal security functions. Japan also has a vigorous space program and has recently indicated its intention to expand its limited space-based intelligence collection capability. In 1997, Japan created a new “Defense Intelligence Headquarters” that unified various functions and established bilateral links with other Asian countries. These developments are a break from Japan’s traditionally heavy reliance upon on American information sharing.²¹⁰ Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles” and its signing of the 1970 United Nations Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibit its possession of nuclear weapons. In addition, Japan’s defensive posture prevents it from deploying ballistic missiles. Despite these restraints, Japan possesses a robust domestic nuclear power program that, if combined with indigenous space technologies, could easily translate into Japan becoming a nuclear power if it so desired. This fact, rarely spoken of openly, serves as an implicit nuclear deterrent for Japan.

²⁰⁹ Hunsberger ed., *Japan’s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, xxix-xxx.

²¹⁰ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – “Japan’s Defence Infrastructure – August 1998” [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

b. Suitability for Coalition Operations

At the present time, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are poorly suited for coalition operations. This is due to a number of factors:

1. The SDF has absolutely no combat experience.
2. Japan's rejection of the principle of collective security and its extreme restrictions on use of force make the SDF appear undependable to allies in the face of hostile action.²¹¹
3. Even in training exercises, the SDF is extremely resistant to receiving orders from foreign commanders. This unwillingness arises from a confused linguistic interpretation of "command" given by the Japanese government. A foreign commander may "command", (*shizu*) a JSDF commander, but only the Japanese Commander-in-Chief (the Prime Minister) may "direct", (*shiki*) the commander. Given that most modern militaries reject such confused terminology under the concept of "one battlefield, one commander" this predilection hampers JSDF participation in multinational military organizations.²¹²
4. SDF officers "rarely go abroad for training and, consequently, there is little need to learn foreign languages, a situation which may hamper...fully integrated UN missions."²¹³
5. Although Japan frequently conducts bilateral exercises with the United States, the SDF "has never participated in any multilateral training in anticipation of a conflict."²¹⁴ This is especially true of the ASDF and the GSDF. Traditionally, exercises are politically toned down so as not to provoke domestic or international accusations that the SDF is being overly aggressive or militaristic.
6. The SDF has been historically under funded in the areas of logistics and operations. In 1994, Wilborn wrote "few troops are able to practice with live ammunition once a year."²¹⁵ Such inadequate funding in combination with overemphasis on disaster relief missions limits SDF combat readiness.

²¹¹ Okazaki Hisahiko, "Japan Must Be Ready to Use Right of Collective Defense," *Daily Yomiuri*, February 26, 2001, [Online] at <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/>> [7 September 2002].

²¹² Maeda, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, 292-293.

²¹³ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia, Army, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

²¹⁴ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

²¹⁵ Wilborn, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?", 15.

A 1998 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment poignantly summarized these difficulties. The assessment offered discouraging prospects for Japan's future contribution to coalition warfare stating:²¹⁶

The actual efficiency of...Japanese arms...remains to be seen, as it is doubtful if any Japanese weapons have actually been used in combat since the end of World War Two. Similarly, it is unclear how well the un-blooded JSDF would perform in an actual confrontation, although it is apparent that modern Japan retains elements of an underlying martial tradition. That said, Japan's involvement with international peacekeeping has yet to involve any serious setbacks. Large-scale casualties (e.g. caused by the sinking of a ship or a major terrorist bombing), sustained casualties (e.g. resulting from persistent sniping, mines, boobytraps, etc.), or a major scandal of the type Canadian and Italian peacekeeping troops have faced resulting from the abuse of indigenous people, could greatly lessen the Japanese public's support for such operations. Clearly, significant, but achievable, doctrinal, logistical and equipment upgrades would be necessary for the JSDF to conduct independent operations, particularly joint-arms power projection operations.

Alternatively, positive prospects exist for the suitability of the SDF in the future. Japan has made substantial improvements in SDF training and operations in recent years indicating its awareness of its shortcomings and a desire to overcome them. Peter Woolley notes that despite its lack of combat experience, the SDF has frequently engaged in what the American military categorizes as MOOTW.²¹⁷ Of sixteen broadly defined categories of MOOTW, the JSDF has actually performed ten of these missions including: arms control, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, and show of force.

Of the six remaining types, Japan is easily capable of participating in four more under its current constitutional restrictions. These are enforcement of economic sanctions, enforcement of exclusion zones, ensurance of freedom of navigation and overflight, and non-

²¹⁶ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "Japan's Defence Industry – August 1998" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

²¹⁷ Woolley, *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*, 145.

combatant evacuation operations. Only two MOOTW are presently impossible for Japan to perform legally: strikes and raids and direct support to insurgencies. Since most military analysts believe that MOOTW represents the future nature of conflict resolution, it can be said that the SDF is already moving in the right direction rather than focusing on huge WWII-style operations.

Other positive indicators can be found in the recent exercise activities of the SDF. GSDF and U.S. forces have worked together more closely in joint exercises such as FOREST LIGHT, YAMA SAKURA, and KEEN SWORD/KEEN EDGE in recent years offering both forces expanded opportunity for education and training. Furthermore, of the three services, the MSDF is the best adapted to coalition operations through countless bilateral training exercises with the U.S. Navy. It has been a long-time participant in the multilateral Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises. RIMPAC is a biennial large-scale multinational power projection/sea control exercise that began in the early 1980s. In 2000, participants included the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Chile, and Great Britain. The SDF has also engaged in joint training with the Russian Navy in 1997 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy in 1999.²¹⁸ Finally, the SDF itself has started working more closely together as one military rather than three separate services in response to the challenges of supporting its growing participation in overseas PKO.²¹⁹

c. Influence on Military Policy

While the influence of the JSDF over defense policy remains relatively small, its senior members have become more assertive in recent years. From 1954 to 1977 the JSDF leadership remained conspicuously silent on matters of defense policy. Largely this was due to an unspoken taboo that SDF members should not question civilian authority in keeping with the “never again” resolutions. In October 1977, this changed, however, with the appointment of General Kurisu Hiroomi. From the very beginning, Kurisu loudly and publicly objected to the ambiguous policies and restrictions placed upon the SDF. In particular, he criticized the government’s declared “defense only” strategy as stupid, saying “the history of war shows that

²¹⁸ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 63.

²¹⁹ Ota, “Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces,” 59.

only offense can win.”²²⁰ For this and other provocative statements he was quickly fired. Nevertheless, the dam had been broken, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, senior SDF officers became more forthright concerning defense matters. Such trends were demonstrated recently by the firing of JDA Vice Minister Nishimura Shingo in October 1999 after he made statements that Japan should rethink its non-nuclear policy and seek to create a modern equivalent of the wartime “Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Finally, since the SDF has limited influence within its own administration, many senior JDA officials and JSDF officers frequently take employment in the defense industry upon retirement in a practice known as *amakudari*, or descent from heaven.²²¹ This enables them to lobby for SDF issues as civilians. Other active duty SDF members are more enterprising and have actually found it more effective to lobby their American military counterparts who then pressure Japanese politicians on issues of defense.²²²

Such assertiveness is strongly opposed within the defense bureaucracy through several measures.²²³ First, the JDA hierarchy is made up almost solely of civilian bureaucrats who submit their policy proposals directly to civilian political leaders. This often occurs without SDF senior officers knowing the particulars until after they are submitted. Second, no senior SDF officer has ever held a top position in the JDA whether active duty or retired. Third, political authorities in the Diet as well as JDA bureaucrats frequently encourage interservice rivalry through the budget process. This serves to dispel the threat of a “united front” by the SDF on defense issues.

One avenue of recourse to the SDF is the JDA’s National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS). This government think tank conducts extensive research into military affairs. NIDS releases its analyses and other findings in a variety of publications including the widely read annual *East Asian Strategic Review*. In its *Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, Council of Defense-Strategic Studies 1999-2000*, NIDS put forward its recommendations to the Japanese government concerning the SDF. The report identified the following issues that must

²²⁰ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: the Untold Story of Japan’s Military Forces*, 216-228.

²²¹ Ibid., 111.

²²² Wilborn, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?”, 7.

²²³ Ibid., 6-7.

be resolved in order for Japan to move forward with its goals of achieving an improved international leadership role:²²⁴

- Permitting JSDF to participate in the practical duties of UN PKO (in other words, allowing them to be exposed to danger)
- Enactment of a law to permit rear-area support of Multinational Forces
- Enactment of emergencies legislation.
- Adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
- Establishment of a system to promote the RMA
- Relaxation of the constitutional interpretation regarding collective self-defense
- Amendment of Constitution Article 9, Item Two

As a whole, the SDF possesses limited influence over national military policy and little representation within the Japanese government. An entrenched bureaucracy and a continuing social bias against members of the SDF create these limitations.

C. MILITARY POSTURES

Differences in political, economic, and military beliefs make it difficult for Japan to decide upon a suitable strategy for how, if at all, the Self-Defense Forces should be used in support of its international security interests. Restated here, these interests have been determined to be: shaping a stable international security environment, supporting the United Nations, and upholding the Japan-United States alliance. Wide ranges of potential military postures are available to Japan toward achieving these interests. These generally fall within three distinct categories: pacifist internationalism, autonomy, and continued static ambivalence. Each of these potential military postures will be discussed in terms of their domestic support and their ability to satisfy Japan's international security interests.

1. Pacifistic Internationalism

This posture represents an idealist vision for Japan's future military policy. Pacifist orientations believe that Japan should make "high-level and convincing" apologies to the

²²⁴ NIDS, *Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, Council of Defense-Strategic Studies 1999-2000*, 23.

nations it harmed during its militaristic past. They see the source of regional enmity as arising from this past and believe that by wholeheartedly pursuing acts of contrition other countries will behave more peacefully toward Japan. This would abrogate the need for military force as a whole.²²⁵

Political parties including the Japan Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, and the left wings of the Clean Government Party and the Democratic Party of Japan would support pacifistic internationalism. Pacifist organizations such as Sokagakkai, and many student groups would also be in favor of this posture. Notable individuals such as Murayama Tomiichi (JSP), Shii Kazuo (JCP, Chairman), Fuyushiba Tetsuzo (CGP General Secretary), Kaifu Toshiki (Independent), Kono Yohei (LDP), and Gotoda Masayoshi (LDP) would also likely be supporters.²²⁶

A potential pacifistic internationalist posture would possess the following characteristics:

- Heavy reliance upon multilateral security arrangements and international laws and organizations for international security
- Minimal defense spending
- Retention of strict constitutional prohibitions upon the SDF
- No collective security arrangements with the United States or other foreign powers or agencies
- Retention of strict legal constraints upon the exercise of military force
- No multinational coalition participation
- Minimal SDF role in PKO
- Overseas dispatch of SDF limited to noncombatant units such as medical and construction teams, observers or weapons inspectors
- International assistance largely through humanitarian aid, financial contributions, and civilian volunteer organizations

Overall, the adoption of this posture would only partially satisfy Japan's international security interests. First, its greatest strength lies in its support of the United Nations. Other

²²⁵ Finn, "Japan's Search for a Global Role: Politics and Security," 125.

²²⁶ Green and Samuels, *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order*, 10.

neutral and non-aggressive countries such as Sweden and Switzerland have made such contributions in the past and are well regarded by the international community for their efforts.²²⁷ Japan, however, possesses much greater resources than these countries and would therefore be expected to provide much more than they do. Second, pacifistic internationalism provides only a modest contribution to shaping a stable international security environment. While it is true that domestic pacifists would welcome such a posture, as well as regional powers that fear increased Japanese military activity, it fails to provide a level of influence in the international arena that more forceful measures allow. Finally, this posture fails to uphold the Japan-U.S. alliance since Washington expects a more active role from its most important and powerful ally.

2. Autonomy

This posture represents an independent and active Japanese military posture. It envisions an expanded Japanese military capability unfettered by constitutional restraints. Japan would eagerly contribute its military power in support of international security interests. In addition, however, Japan would also more freely exercise military force in support of its own national self-interests. Japan would provide for its own national defense, with or without an alliance to the United States. In every respect, Japan would be a “normal” nation and a hopeful aspirant to a 19th century type of great power status in a developing multipolar world.

At present, no significant Japanese political parties advocate such a harsh transition from the nation’s current military posture. Only nationalist and ultraconservative groups avidly support forms of autonomy. Notable individuals who advocate this course openly are few in number. Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintaro (LDP) and Kajiyama Seiroku (LDP) would be supporters.²²⁸

A potential autonomous military posture would possess the following characteristics:

- A primary reliance upon autonomous defense capabilities for national security
- Preference for multilateral arrangements as secondary sources of security
- A substantially weakened (or abolished) Japan-U.S. alliance

²²⁷ Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, (New York: Perennial, HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 167.

²²⁸ Green and Samuels, *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan’s Choices in the New World Order*, 10.

- Increased defense spending
- Abrogation of constitutional prohibitions on military issues
- Comprehensive collective security arrangements possible
- Relaxed legal constraints upon the exercise of military force
- Vigorous support of multinational coalitions
- Unilateral use of military power in support of national self-interests
- Wide-ranging SDF participation in PKO to include combatant units
- Overall expanded SDF capability to permit support of globally deployed units

Taken as a whole, the adoption of autonomy would fail to satisfy all three of Japan's international security interests. First, it would not create a stable security environment, particularly in Northeast Asia. In fact, "it is difficult to conceive of any other single development more likely to spur an Asian arms race faster than Japan's decision to unilaterally provide for its own security".²²⁹ Additionally, no posture would strengthen the Japanese pacifist movement more than the adoption of such an overtly militaristic one as this.²³⁰ Second, this posture implicitly calls for a diminished reliance upon and commitment to the United States. Under this posture, "a real security crisis could lead to a [total] breakdown of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."²³¹ In the end, autonomy would do little to support the interests of the United Nations. While Japan would achieve greater independence and national power, it "would have far less influence in global affairs."²³²

For a variety of reasons, it is highly unlikely that this posture would be adopted by Japan in its present condition. However, its likelihood could increase if Japan experienced a natural or economic disaster of sufficient magnitude that would serve to strengthen the political platforms of the far right.²³³

²²⁹ Joseph N. Flanz, "Tightening the Helmet Strings: The Future of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship," U.S. Army War College Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, April 2000), 7.

²³⁰ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 204-205.

²³¹ Green and Samuels, *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order*, 21.

²³² *Ibid.*, 21.

²³³ Pyle and Heginbotham, "Japan," 91.

3. Static Ambivalence or “More of the Same”

This posture represents the current state of Japanese military policy, one that has prevailed since 1952 with relatively few significant changes. In theory, it seeks to strike a comfortable balance between the two extremes of pacifism and autonomy. In practice, its performance disappoints nearly everyone. Static ambivalence continues to draw a halfhearted support from a majority of Japanese.

The posture of static ambivalence possesses the following characteristics:

- Heavy reliance upon the Japan-U.S. alliance for national security
- Relatively low defense spending
- A confused tangle of constitutional relaxations and prohibitions on military issues
- No collective security arrangements with the United States or other foreign powers or agencies
- Strict legal constraints upon the exercise of military force
- Multinational coalition participation permitted in rear areas only
- Minimal SDF role in PKO and generally limited to noncombatant units
- Substantial international assistance largely through humanitarian aid, financial contributions, and civilian volunteer organizations

Previous discussion of the policy of static ambivalence has demonstrated its inability to satisfy either domestic or international demands upon Japan. It also only partially realizes Japan's international security interests. First, the limited and “start-stop” activities produced by static ambivalence make a relatively minor impact on shaping a stable international security environment. Although this posture serves to maintain a balance of power in Northeast Asia, it does little for the security of the world outside the region. Second, it also fails to achieve the goals of the United Nations by constraining the ability of Japan to contribute to UN missions in a manner that befits Japan's economic and military potential. Finally, this posture has served to create considerable difficulties within the Japan-U.S. alliance especially in the areas of defense burden sharing and combined military operations.

None of these postures successfully attains Japan's international security goals. Consequently, a new and more effective Japanese strategy must be found. Chapter Four presents such an alternative posture in the form of martial internationalism.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. THE CASE FOR MARTIAL INTERNATIONALISM

Japan requires a new military posture in order to realize its international security goals. A pacifist option is unrealistic while an autonomous posture is too provocative and potentially destabilizing. Efforts to find a compromise in the form of static ambivalence have worked in the past, but owing to constitutional restrictions, are becoming increasingly complicated and unable to meet the international security challenges of the 21st century. Clearly, the best alternative is to find a middle ground between the policy paralysis of static ambivalence and the overt aggressiveness of an autonomous posture. This chapter presents the case for Japanese martial internationalism as a possible solution to this strategic dilemma.

A. THE STRATEGY

This posture represents an assertive yet cooperative potential Japanese military posture. It envisions full Japanese military participation within multilateral security arrangements as well as within UN-sanctioned coalition operations. Japan would assume a greater share of its own national defense while remaining allied to the United States. The Japanese constitution would be revised to permit military activities accepted as norms by the international community and in accordance with the United Nations charter. In essence, Japan would be a militarily “normal” nation, but one bound to and a vital component of international security regimes.

A posture of martial internationalism would have the following characteristics:

- National security achieved through a calculated mixture of autonomous capabilities and bilateral and multilateral alliances
- Moderate defense spending
- Amendment of constitutional prohibitions on military issues
- Authorization of collective security arrangements with allied militaries
- Continued legal constraints upon the exercise of military force
- Full SDF participation in UN PKO and multinational coalitions

Martial internationalism supports all three of Japan's international security interests. First, by contributing military power to UN-sanctioned multinational coalitions and peacekeeping operations, it actively supports the shaping of stable international security environment. Such results are not possible by Japan acting unilaterally or even bilaterally within the Japan-U.S. alliance. Second, martial internationalism dynamically supports the United Nations by supplying a level of effort commensurate with Japan's capability to provide. Third, the posture upholds the Japan-U.S. alliance by permitting collective security arrangements with U.S. forces and active support of American operations in combat operations. For these reasons, martial internationalism represents an ideal potential Japanese strategic design.

For comparison, Table 1 compares martial internationalism to other postures with respect to specific security-related criteria.

	PACIFISTIC INTERNATIONALISM	STATIC AMBIVALENCE	MARTIAL INTERNATIONALISM	AUTONOMY
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS	MULTILATERAL	BILATERAL	MULTILATERAL	UNILATERAL
DEFENSE SPENDING	MINIMAL	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
ARTICLE 9	STRICT INTERPRETATION	RELAXED INTERPRETATION	AMENDMENT REQUIRED	ABOLISHED
COLLECTIVE SECURITY POSSIBLE	NO	NO	YES	YES
USE OF FORCE	STRICT CONSTRAINTS	STRICT CONSTRAINTS	SOME CONSTRAINTS	FEW CONSTRAINTS
COALITION PARTICIPATION	NONE	REAR AREAS	FULL SDF PARTICIPATION	FULL SDF PARTICIPATION
PKO PARTICIPATION	CIVILIAN / NON- COMBATANT ONLY	LIMITED SDF	FULL SDF	FULL SDF
SHAPES STABLE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	PARTIAL	PARTIAL	YES	NO
SUPPORTS UNITED NATIONS	YES	PARTIAL	YES	NO
UPHOLDS JAPAN- U.S. ALLIANCE	NO	PARTIAL	YES	NO

Table 1. Japanese Military Postures and Relevant Security-Related Issues

B. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

The adoption of martial internationalism would dramatically affect Japan's domestic situation. Politically, this posture would find its strongest support from Ozawa Ichiro's Liberal Party and conservative elements of the LDP and the DPJ. It would be opposed by ardent advocates of pacifism in the JCP, SDP, and CGP and other organizations affiliated with the peace movement. Public fears of resurgent militarism and ultra-nationalism would become important issues. Additionally, Japan would be forced to determine its capacity for tolerating the combat deaths that would inherently and inevitably arise from a martial internationalism posture. Although the influence of the political left has declined in recent years, such divisions would cause widespread public debate over the policy. On the other hand, this healthy debate would encourage the resolution of the ongoing constitutional debate. In the end, public opinion and national desire for greater autonomy and international prestige make the proposal of martial internationalism an achievable prospect.²³⁴

Martial internationalism would have similar effects in Japan's economic and military spheres. Economically, Japanese business would be forced to bring its interests more in line with the security side of the comprehensive security triangle. This would be a difficult transition given their historical predominance in Japanese foreign affairs policy-making. On the other hand, martial internationalism would offer Japanese industry clear opportunities in defense production. A more visible Japanese presence abroad would also raise global awareness of Japanese culture and products. For the JSDF, martial internationalism offers innumerable benefits. Among these would be improved morale, combat readiness, and social standing. By representing Japan in humanitarian and multinational military efforts, the SDF would be viewed as contributing to the security of the international community rather than simply defending Japan against an implausible invasion.

²³⁴ Pyle and Heginbotham, "Japan," 87-88.

C. REGIONAL OPPOSITION

1. China

China has traditionally resisted all Japanese military initiatives and would be the strongest foreign opponent of a martial internationalist posture. As the historical center of power in East Asia, China continues to view its regional role as that of the “Middle Kingdom.” In both realist and ideological terms, China views Japan as an extension of “American hegemonism” and a competitor for regional influence.²³⁵ In a similar fashion, Japan has become increasingly concerned with China’s military modernization programs and burgeoning economic power. Japan rejects Chinese aspirations to become a regional hegemon and fears losing its economic sway since “in Asia, China is now known as the country that faces its [economic] problems and resolves them, and this reputation has seriously undermined Japan’s aspirations to lead the region.”²³⁶

In the midst of these apprehensions, trade between China and Japan expanded at an astonishing rate. Bilateral trade swelled from \$18.2 billion in 1990 to \$62.4 billion in 1996 and continues to grow at a rapid rate.²³⁷ At present, Japan is China’s largest trading partner, and China is Japan’s second largest after the United States.²³⁸ Since the disintegration of the Soviet threat, relations between Japan and China have worsened in spite of this greater economic interdependence.²³⁹

In the early 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations appeared warmer than ever before. This began in 1978 when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and Japan agreed to provide China with massive loans to assist China’s developing market economy reforms. Throughout the 1980s, both countries shared a common strategic threat in form of the Soviet Union and a common partner in the United States.²⁴⁰ After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States distanced itself from China while Japan struggled to retain its growing

²³⁵ Hwei-ling Huo, “Japan and China: Collaborators or Rivals,” ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan’s Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 157.

²³⁶ Overholt, “Japan’s Economy, at War With Itself,” 144.

²³⁷ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 77.

²³⁸ CIA World Factbook, found [Online] <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>> [5 September 2002]

²³⁹ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 77.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 78.

connections. In 1990, Tokyo coordinated with Washington to relax embargoes placed on China thus staying in Beijing's favor.²⁴¹ When Japan passed its 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Bill, China was initially wary but then voiced uncharacteristic support for Japan's military role in the Cambodian mission.²⁴² In October 1992, both countries welcomed a chance at wartime reconciliation that resulted from the unprecedented visit of the Japanese emperor and empress to China. The emperor made public statements of regret for suffering caused during World War Two and there was hope that issues of war history might finally be laid to rest.²⁴³

At this time, relations began to deteriorate and have improved little since. In 1992, China enacted a territorial waters act that encompassed the Senkaku islands, which the Chinese claim as the Diaoyutai islands.²⁴⁴ Later, in 1995, China conducted a series of nuclear tests against strong Japanese protests, especially from the disarmament movement. In response, Japan threatened to cancel developmental assistance loans to China in an attempt to modify Beijing's behavior. Instead, China continued its tests until the following year, proving the weakness of Japanese economic levers upon Beijing.²⁴⁵

In March 1996, China bracketed Taiwan with missile firings in an attempt to influence upcoming Taiwanese elections against voting for independence. The United States responded by sending two carrier battlegroups to the Taiwan Straits as a demonstration of support to Taiwan and to deter further Chinese aggression. Japan tried to stay out of the conflict, but the fact that the American Navy had deployed from Japanese bases exacerbated tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. Furthermore, China saw Taiwan being included in Japan's declared security interest of "areas surrounding Japan" contained in the 1995 NDPO and in the new Japan-U.S. "Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for 21st Century". These activities brought Sino-Japanese relations to an all-time postwar low.²⁴⁶

²⁴¹ LeFeber, *The Clash*, 386.

²⁴² Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 78.

²⁴³ Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 290.

²⁴⁴ Fukuyama and Oh, *The US-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*, 12.

²⁴⁵ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 80-82.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 90.

Japan recognizes the “one China principle” regarding Taiwan, but its non-specific attitude toward the issue irritates China.²⁴⁷ Japan and Taiwan have historically enjoyed a lucrative commercial bond in addition to common cultural connections. In general, Japan desires to see a preservation of the status quo relationship between China and Taiwan.²⁴⁸ Even if accomplished peacefully, the unification of Taiwan and China would strengthen China’s military and strategic position in East Asia. Worse, if China chooses to settle the issue by force, Japan would suffer economically and likely be drawn by the United States into a military conflict with China.

Other recent events led to confrontations. The Senkaku islands issue arose again in October 1996 when JMSA vessels blocked Chinese and Taiwanese protestors from approaching the islands after a Japanese right-wing group, the “Japan Youth Federation,” put a small lighthouse on one of the islets.²⁴⁹ The group then placed a shrine to war dead on the island in 2000. Moreover, throughout this period China became increasingly infuriated with Japan’s insensitivity to wartime history issues.²⁵⁰ This included multiple visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, statements by several top leaders denying Japan’s culpability and actions during the war, and the publication of controversial history textbooks that downplayed Japanese war atrocities.

Japan and China also have continually wrangled over the issue of modernization within their respective militaries and the prospects for future expansionism. The Chinese government considers the Japan-U.S. alliance to have shifted its containment target from the defunct Soviet Union to China. China sees joint research efforts by the United States and Japan in the area of theater missile defense as an indicator of this realignment.²⁵¹ China also opposes Japan’s plan’s to extend its naval reach through the construction of refueling aircraft, helicopter carrier ships, and tank landing ships and “is determined that Japan not replace the United States as the

²⁴⁷ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 90-92.

²⁴⁸ See Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift*, 386-400.

²⁴⁹ “China Fumes over Rightists’ shrine on Senkaku Islands,” *The Japan Times Online*, 1 May 2000, [Online] at <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20000501a2.html>> [28 August 2002].

²⁵⁰ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 94-96.

²⁵¹ Michael J. Green, Patrick M. Cronin, and Paul S. Giarra, “The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 175-178.

Asia-Pacific's dominant maritime power.”²⁵² Japan voices these same concerns regarding China's naval buildup. Specifically, they object to the Chinese purchase of Russian-built warships such as the aircraft carrier *Varyag* and a second Sovremenny-class destroyer as a basis for developing China's own indigenous naval program.²⁵³ Conversely, these fears may be unfounded, however. As much as Russian purchases permit short-term tactical advantages, Chinese power remains predominately land-bound. Today, the Chinese navy continues to remain a coastal and defensively oriented force.²⁵⁴ Estimates range out to thirty years before the PRC could effectively project and sustain offshore military operations.²⁵⁵ Nonetheless, mutual mistrust in the area of military developments continues to strain the relationship. Japan plans to reduce ODA assistance to China since, in its present state of economic difficulty; it feels it is unreasonable to give money to China when the PLA defense budget has been steadily increasing throughout the 1990s.²⁵⁶

Despite these disputes, Japan and China share some areas of common agreement beyond purely economic ties. One example is their treatment of North Korea.²⁵⁷ For many years, China backed the North Korean regime in its ideological confrontation with South Korea and the United States. In recent years, Chinese support of the North Korean regime became less outspoken owing to frustration with the intractability of North Korea's leadership. Japan and China agree that Korean unification should occur at a slow and measured pace so as not to incur a collapse of North Korea, mass migrations of refugees, and economic turmoil. Furthermore, China reluctantly concedes to the Japan-U.S. alliance to the alternative of an independent “normalized” Japan free of American restrictions on its actions.²⁵⁸ With regard to the Senkaku islands, on September 5, 2000, China agreed to stop intrusions by marine research vessels into Japan's Economic Exclusion Zone and established a dialogue with Japan to

²⁵² Bernard Cole, “Asia at Sea,” *Proceedings*, vol. 123, March 1997, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press), 36.

²⁵³ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 208-209.

²⁵⁴ See Bernard Cole, *Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century*, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001).

²⁵⁵ Woolley, Peter J., *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*, 77.

²⁵⁶ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 193.

²⁵⁷ Hyung Kook Kim, “Japan, Korea, and Northeast Asia: A Korean View,” ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan's Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 170.

²⁵⁸ Hwei-ling Huo, “Japan and China: Collaborators or Rivals,” ed. Warren S. Hunsberger, *Japan's Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, 159.

promote cooperative development of undersea resources in the area.²⁵⁹ China also recognizes the potential for Japan to eventually become a regional partner rather than adversary especially since a stronger Japan thwarts Russian designs in the region.²⁶⁰ Finally, the Chinese Communist Party is experiencing generational change. This so-called “fourth-generation” of inner Party leadership is less ideologically driven than its predecessors and more inclined to pragmatic dealings with foreign nations, including Japan.²⁶¹

In sum, China would oppose Japan’s adoption of martial internationalism can do little about it.²⁶² Economic manipulation works in Japan’s favor not China’s at this stage of Chinese economic development. Furthermore, China’s perpetual use of history as a means to embarrass Japan into doing what it wants is having less and less effect upon a younger Japanese population. One example of this occurred during the October 2001 Japan-China summit when Chinese President Jiang Zemin told Prime Minister Koizumi that “correctly treating historical issues is the political foundation for Sino-Japanese relations.”²⁶³ The statement resulted in widespread Japanese public outcry and signaled an end to the time when China will be able to effectively use this issue as a means of influence over Japan. At the same time, in the context of discussions on Japan’s contributions to the War on Terrorism, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji told Koizumi that “the expansion of the overseas activity of the JSDF should be undertaken prudently.”²⁶⁴ This evidenced a marked change from previous harsh criticisms of Japanese military activity. Although this may just have been a politically convenient comment given the widespread global support for the War on Terrorism, it may indicate a greater tolerance for a more active Japanese military role in support of multinational coalitions.

2. North Korea

The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) shares China’s ideological and realist opposition to increased Japanese military activity. Many Japanese see North Korea as

²⁵⁹ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 213-214.

²⁶⁰ Hayes, *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, 295.

²⁶¹ Li Cheng, “Jiang Zemin’s Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC,” *China Quarterly*, #161, March 2000, 39-40.

²⁶² Hwei-ling Huo, “Japan and China: Collaborators or Rivals,” 157.

²⁶³ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 192.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

“consistently accusatory, pointing the finger on every possible occasion.”²⁶⁵ In contrast to China, however, the DPRK remains far more isolated from the world and has much smaller economic connections to Japan. Japan views North Korea as the greatest threat to its national security as well as the security of Northeast Asia as a whole.²⁶⁶

Japan has experienced a decade of anxiety regarding North Korea. Although North Korea had entered the United Nations along with South Korea in 1991, it remained as belligerent as ever toward its southern neighbors. In 1993 a North Korean test firing of a *Nodong-1* ballistic missile provoked fears within the JSDF that “the Soviet ‘evil empire’ had vanished only to be replaced by a ‘little evil empire’”²⁶⁷ SDF leaders lobbied the government strongly for a return to the Nakasone era cooperation with Washington on missile defense systems. Their fears proved prescient when, on Aug 31, 1998, the DPRK launched a new missile type, the *Taep'o-dong-1*, this time flying it over Hokkaido. This and the subsequently designed *Taep'o-dong-2* are designed as three-stage intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking any targets in the Japanese home islands. No other event in the 1990s brought home to Japan more forcefully the realization of their precarious security situation in Northeast Asia.²⁶⁸

Other issues continue to mar the relationship between Japan and North Korea. At a broad level, North Korea unfavorably views Japan's association with the United States and the implications of American categorizing of the DPRK as a “rogue state” and a member of the “axis of evil.”²⁶⁹ In a similar light, North Korea condemns Japan's growing closeness to South Korea. On a smaller scale, Pyongyang shares in the same rhetoric as China regarding Japanese treatment of its war record.

Japan is troubled by North Korea for many reasons. First, Japan fears North Korea's persistent development of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles in addition to its nuclear weapons potential.²⁷⁰ Second, Japan remains angry at North Korea for abducting as

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 161.

²⁶⁶ Pyle and Heginbotham, “Japan,” 103.

²⁶⁷ Maeda, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, 305.

²⁶⁸ Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, 10.

²⁶⁹ “North Korea Apologizes to Japan for Abductions,” *The New York Times*, 17 September 2002, A1.

²⁷⁰ “North Korea Amasses Chemical Weapons,” *Washington Times*, 17 September 2002, A1.

many as a dozen young Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s to be used in training spies. Third, over the years, Japan and North Korea have engaged in numerous cat and mouse chases at sea when suspected DPRK intelligence-gathering ships intruded into Japan's territorial waters.²⁷¹ In 1999, this resulted in JMSA firing warning shots at a fleeing North Korean vessel. A similar situation repeated itself in December 2001 that resulted in the sinking of a North Korean ship. Finally, despite recent assurances by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the contrary, Japan fears that the expected breaking of the KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organization) promise to provide light-water reactors to the DPRK by 2003 (not seriously going to be finished until 2008) may result in another round of missile tests.²⁷²

Even with all of these points of contention, Japan and North Korea found agreement in a few areas during the 1990s. In 1991, a joint Japan-Russian UN Development Project in the Tyumen River region represents a potential source of reconciliation between Japan and the DPRK.²⁷³ North Korea also favorably viewed Japanese participation in brokering the KEDO as well as financial and technical assistance in constructing safe nuclear power systems in North Korea. Relations have also improved with North Korea's agreement to release Japanese Red Army terrorists that found refuge in North Korea over thirty years ago.²⁷⁴

A major breakthrough in Japan-DPRK relations occurred on September 17, 2002 with the first ever summit between a Japanese Prime Minister and a North Korean leader.²⁷⁵ Prime Minister Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang and "expressed regret," but not a formal apology, for Japan's war history.²⁷⁶ In return, Kim Jong Il agreed to allow at least four Japanese, whom DPRK intelligence agents had previously abducted, to return home. He has stated that they are the last living Japanese hostages remaining in North Korea.²⁷⁷ In addition, he promised

²⁷¹ Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia, Navy, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002]

²⁷² NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 160.

²⁷³ Hyung Kook Kim, "Japan, Korea, and Northeast Asia: A Korean View," 175.

²⁷⁴ "North Korea Sending Signals to Japan," CNN.com [Online] at <<http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/28/nkorea.japan/>> [17 September 2002].

²⁷⁵ "Historic Parley in Pyongyang," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 September 2002 [Online] at <http://www.csmonitor.com/search_content/0918/p06s01-woap.html> [18 September 2002].

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Koizumi that spy ship activities in Japanese waters would cease.²⁷⁸ The resolution of these sensitive issues will stand as a landmark achievement in the two countries' relations.

North Korea's likely opposition to a Japanese posture of martial internationalism can be discounted as a significant factor. In many ways, its rhetoric would have far less impact than challenges coming from China. Although North Korea poses a direct security threat to Japan through its missile program, it is highly unlikely that it would risk the massive retaliation of the United States by threatening Japan in a manner similar to what it previously did in 1998.

D. REGIONAL ANXIETY

1. South Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) would experience considerable anxiety over Japan adopting a posture of martial internationalism given its past "uneasy" feelings toward Japan's participation in UN PKO.²⁷⁹ Mutual apprehension arises from a longstanding Japanese impression of southern Korea as a "dagger pointed at Japan's heart" as well as Korean views that Japan sees Korea as a Japanese "bridge to the Asian mainland."²⁸⁰ Accordingly, careful management of this crucial relationship would be required. Contemporary Japan-ROK relations are less favorable than would be expected from countries that share a common ally in the United States. To a large extent, South Koreans feel a "sense of dissatisfaction" regarding Japan and a decrease in the friendliness that prevailed from 1998-1999.²⁸¹

Japan-ROK relations suffered from a variety of disagreements during the 1990s. Hopeful prospects began with a visit in 1990 by Emperor Akihito and in 1993 by Prime Minister Hosokawa. In both cases, each expressed heartfelt regret at the abuses of the past.²⁸² In the midst of these apologies, however, the issue of "comfort women" became increasingly public. Starting in 1991, many Korean women began testifying openly of their treatment during the Second World War. Since as many as 139,000 of these women had been forced into labor as prostitutes for the Japanese army, lawsuits against the Japanese government mounted

²⁷⁸ "8 Abductees Dead, Five Alive," *Daily Yomiuri Online*, [Online] at <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20020918wo41.html>> [18 September 2002].

²⁷⁹ Hyung Kook Kim, "Japan, Korea, and Northeast Asia: A Korean View," 169.

²⁸⁰ Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 61.

²⁸¹ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review* 2002, 151.

in number “like vengeful ghosts.”²⁸³ Through a settlement with these women, the Japanese government established a fund for assisting them and their families but it was largely unsatisfactory since many women simply wanted hard cash and not social programs. Further frustrations of a lesser nature occurred concerning the possession of the Takeshima/Tokdo islands lying between Japan and South Korea and perpetual arguments over fishing rights. These disputes deepened further with Japan’s irritation with Russia for permitting South Korean fishing ventures in the seas around the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands. Like China and North Korea, South Korea has been deeply frustrated with Japanese handling of wartime historical issues. This anger peaked when Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine in August 2001 in the midst of the continuing Japanese textbook controversy. In a spectacular display of protest, twenty men in Seoul severed their little fingers in protest.²⁸⁴

The subject of Korean unification, in the words of Michael Green, remains the “500-pound gorilla” among the variables in the Japan-ROK relationship.²⁸⁵ Many South Koreans believe that Japan fears the unification of the peninsula and the altered strategic balance of power such an event would bring. They feel that Japan generally praises efforts at reconciliation while secretly hoping that it occurs later rather than sooner. On the other hand, they appreciate the firm commitment Japan has made toward bringing about a measured unification process through financial assistance and open dialogue with Pyongyang.²⁸⁶

In many ways, these insinuations are well founded. Because of historical influences, “Korean patriotism is anti-Japanism.”²⁸⁷ Japan fears that once Korea unifies, it may fall into the orbit of China and increase its power. In addition, Japan knows that neither China nor the new Korea will ever tolerate a massive American military presence on the peninsula.²⁸⁸ This

²⁸² Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 290.

²⁸³ Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, 269-270.

²⁸⁴ Lim Yun Suk, “Koreans cut off fingers to protest Yasukuni Shrine visit,” Channelnewsasia.com, 13 August 2001 [Online] at <<http://cna.mediacorpnews.com/articles/2001/08/13/eastasia528.html>> [15 August 2002].

²⁸⁵ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 142.

²⁸⁶ Hyung Kook Kim, “Japan, Korea, and Northeast Asia: A Korean View,” 171-172.

²⁸⁷ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 231.

²⁸⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Harpers Collins Publishers Inc., 1997), 54-55.

would precipitate an American withdrawal from the region that would either fall back on overly burdened Japanese bases or further east into the Pacific where their presence would be less visible in the region. If the latter occurred, Japan would almost certainly feel threatened and seek to ensure its own defense autonomously. This would spark a regional arms race damaging to everyone.

In the face of these pressures, Japan and South Korea have struggled to improve their relationship. Foremost, trade and economic activity between the two countries exceeds \$50 billion annually. South Korea benefited greatly from Japanese loans during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.²⁸⁹ Japan and the ROK established numerous security dialogues in the past ten years and warships of both nations visited the other's countries for the first time since the normalization of relations in 1965. The common bond of the United States also worked to improve relations between the two countries through the establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in 1999.²⁹⁰ Although this body has yet to accomplish significant military cooperation between Japan and South Korea, it is a foundation from which to work in the future.

Thus, while South Korea is anxious about a more militarily active Japan, there is common ground to work upon to improve the relationship. One possibility is that Japanese military involvement in UN activities actually might spark greater military cooperation between South Korea and Japan if they were involved in the same operation in a distant and neutral setting. As Victor Cha pointed out, "while history may tinge interaction between Japan and Korea, it is the larger geostrategic concerns that ultimately determine outcomes."²⁹¹

2. Russia

Russia would greet a Japanese adoption of martial internationalism with mixed feelings and concern. Russia continues to see Japan in the light of its role in the American Cold War coalition, in addition to its much longer history of competition for influence in Northeast Asia.

²⁸⁹ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 138.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 144.

²⁹¹ Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, 231.

Likewise, Japan continues to feel that Russia “is a troublesome and threatening neighbor.”²⁹² Significantly, Russia and Japan still have yet to sign a peace treaty ending the Second World War between them and trade activity is negligible. As with South Korea, a changed Japanese military posture will require careful handling of Japan-Russian relations.

Japanese relations with newly reorganized Russia fared little better than they had been with the Soviet Union. Despite statements of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, many Japanese found it difficult to relax their guard concerning their old foe. The 1992 Japanese Defense White Paper stated this clearly, declaring that although the Cold War had ended, the threat of Russia remained.²⁹³ The later popularity of Russian ultra-nationalist Zhirinovskiy in 1993, concerns over Russian political stability, and continued failure to reach a settlement over the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands sustained these trends. A 1993 Yeltsin-Hosokawa summit in which Russia offered trade and economic development concessions to Japan also failed to achieve any significant results due to fears that money invested in Russia would be lost in a “black hole” of instability.²⁹⁴

Japan and Russia deviate on many military issues as well. Russian sales of high-tech weaponry to China, especially naval vessels, continue to irritate Japan. Mutual distrust has also influenced Moscow to maintain a large proportion of their limited military forces in Russia’s far eastern military districts just as in the Soviet-era.²⁹⁵ Despite this land-based threat, however, Japanese fears of any naval threat have greatly diminished owing to the dilapidated state of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Most analysts believe that even if Russia devoted renewed interest in rebuilding the fleet, it will take many years to recover from the damage caused by neglect during the 1990s.²⁹⁶ As a final point, tensions between the two countries heightened over Russia’s negative reaction to Japan’s proposed implementation of ballistic missile defense systems.²⁹⁷

²⁹² Mendl, *Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 52.

²⁹³ Fukuyama and Oh, *The US-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*, 9.

²⁹⁴ Mochizuki, *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia*, 146.

²⁹⁵ Conclusion drawn from data concerning Russian military force dispersion in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1999-2000*, (London: Oxford university Press, 2000), 116-117.

²⁹⁶ Woolley, *Japan’s Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*, 75.

²⁹⁷ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 249-250.

Some measures of rapprochement occurred in recent years. Indicators of this were Japanese initiatives to include Russia more thoroughly in sessions of the ASEAN Regional Forum, an organization devoted to promoting greater security and military stability in the Asian-Pacific region. The previously mentioned Tyumen river project is another example and represents a prospect for greater Japanese economic assistance to Russia in developing Siberian resources in coming years.²⁹⁸ Finally, both Japan and Russia share a common concern over Chinese military developments.

Taken as a whole, none of these difficulties stand as insurmountable obstacles to Japan's adoption of martial internationalism. While Russia remains a potent military power, its energies are too taxed in managing its many internal difficulties to effectively counter a Japanese military posture shift. In fact, such an action would have an exactly opposite affect by stirring Japanese nationalism in an unfavorable direction for Russia.

E. INTERNATIONAL ENCOURAGEMENT

1. The United States

In 2002, Japan has no stronger foreign relationship than with the United States. It is Japan's only ally and the guarantor of its national security. Fully 30 percent of Japanese exports are sold in the United States and 19 percent of its imports are American products.²⁹⁹ Given this close affiliation and a growing strategic consensus, the United States would likely be an ardent supporter of Japanese martial internationalism.

Japan-U.S. ties suffered in the early 1990s but have improved ever since. The Gulf War and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led many Americans to believe that Japan might rise as future adversary. Popular writings such as George Friedman and Meredith Lebard's *The Coming War with Japan* and Ishihara Shintaro's *The Japan That Can Say No* played upon these fears in both countries. The creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1993 aroused Japanese suspicions that they were being purposefully excluded to contain their economy.³⁰⁰ Nonetheless, agreements such as the 1996 "Joint Declaration on

²⁹⁸ Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 57.

²⁹⁹ CIA World Factbook, [Online] <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>> [5 September 2002]

³⁰⁰ Hellman, Pyle, Gilpin, Watanabe, and Kikuchi eds., *From APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997),137-38.

Security – Alliance for 21st Century” and the 1997 “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” demonstrated the vitality of the alliance.

From an American perspective, the alliance is the most critical component of the several regional bilateral agreements maintained by the United States. Foremost, through its provisions the United States enjoys the ability to permanently position a wide variety of conventional military forces and intelligence-gathering assets across an enormous geographic area. Nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel serve in Japan with the Japanese government contributing “\$4.86 billion in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally.”³⁰¹ This amounts to over 75 percent of U.S. basing costs and a considerable cost-savings for the United States if the same forces were based on American soil. This geographic placement of American power gives the United States the ability to directly influence the course of events along much of the eastern periphery of continental Asia. This means to project power is impossible to duplicate from other U.S. bases or even with deployed naval forces.³⁰² A move toward martial internationalism would improve the effectiveness of America’s defense structure, particularly through better coordination between the U.S. military and the JSDF and the establishment of collective security instruments.³⁰³

The nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance confers both political advantages and disadvantages upon the United States. Beneficially, the alliance satisfies American desires for bilateral arrangements that it can more easily orchestrate than those provided by multilateral systems.³⁰⁴ In addition, the alliance has historically supplied the United States with a reliable and influential political partner in the international arena.

In contrast, the alliance also creates negative political reactions both domestically and internationally. Domestically, American isolationists continue to call for the withdrawal of

³⁰¹ Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, 27 MARCH 2001, [Online] at <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2001/010327db.pdf> [30 August 2002].

³⁰² Paul S. Giarra, “U.S. Bases in Japan: Historical Background and Innovative Approaches to Maintaining Strategic Presence,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 115.

³⁰³ Sheila A. Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 69-70.

³⁰⁴ Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2000), 85-87.

overseas American military forces, particularly in Asia, where their presence exposes them to danger and agitates foreign attitudes towards the United States. This viewpoint often acts in conjunction with the belief that the Japanese have enjoyed a “free ride” within the alliance. This has been borne out in numerous U.S. Department of Defense reports that criticize Japan’s limited contributions to international security.³⁰⁵ Some Americans argue that if Japan continues to be recalcitrant toward its duties as a military partner, the United States may be better served by “finding a new friend” in Asia willing to share the burden of regional security.³⁰⁶

From a Japanese perspective, the relationship offers both strengths and challenges. On the positive side, the alliance provides Japan with the assurance of security from the world’s most powerful nation. This protection enables Japan to focus its strategic interests on resource and economic development and less on defense issues. Even Japan’s vital sources of Middle East oil are ensured by the United States through its military and diplomatic policies. The alliance also provides Japan with substantial improvements to its own defensive capabilities through military technology transfers such as AEGIS weapons systems, F-15 fighters, elements of ballistic missile defense, and the American “nuclear umbrella.”

The alliance also creates several negative factors affecting Japan’s perception of its strategic security.³⁰⁷ Primarily, the Japan-U.S. alliance makes Japan a target for those opposed to the United States anywhere in the world. This was overwhelmingly clear during the Cold War when Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons were targeted against American military facilities in Japan from only a short distance away. Secondly, the alliance inhibits the freedom of Japan to make significant foreign policy decisions on its own interest. Finally, as previously discussed, little coordination exists regarding joint command and control of American and Japanese military forces if Japan was attacked by an outside power.

Under the alliance, Japan experiences a similar division of advantages and disadvantages in the political and social realms. First, Japanese society profits enormously by

³⁰⁵ See United States Department of Defense Reports *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* [Online] at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied.html>> [15 September 2002].

³⁰⁶ Richard J. Samuels and Christopher P. Twomey, “The Eagle Eyes the Pacific: American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia after the Cold War,” eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 16-17.

³⁰⁷ Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, 23-24.

concentrating on its internal development over its maintenance of military power. A second positive factor lies in the fact that Japan does wield some degree of influence over the United States concerning the basing of forces in Japan.³⁰⁸ Although seldom used overtly, the potential of this pressure gives Tokyo a measure of flexibility in dealing with Washington over its policies toward Japan. Finally, although viewed by some as a negative characteristic, the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to shape Japanese internal politics by attracting voter attention to defense issues that would normally take a back seat to domestic fiscal concerns.³⁰⁹

Politically and socially, Japan suffers some hindrances because of the alliance. First, the interests of the United States dominate Japanese foreign policy.³¹⁰ This profoundly affects the Japanese independent self-image and provokes nationalistic and anti-American sentiment. Related to this is the considerable public unrest concerning the numbers, type, and behavior of American forces stationed in Japan and the structure of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).³¹¹ This is particularly evident on the island of Okinawa, where crimes committed by U.S. troops against the local population continue to generate calls for American withdrawal. Many Japanese believe that dependence upon the United States limits their options internationally and acts against their desire to be more involved in multilateral arrangements.³¹² Since 2000, the United States has aggravated Japan by its refusal to adopt environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto accord, and by its confrontational and unilateral foreign policy.³¹³

Finally, a persistent fear of abandonment by the United States exists in Japan. Terashima Jitsuro, President of Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, expressed this view saying:

³⁰⁸ Giarra, "U.S. Bases in Japan: Historical Background and Innovative Approaches to Maintaining Strategic Presence," 115-117.

³⁰⁹ Lee W. Howell, "The Alliance and Post-Cold War Political Realignment in Japan," eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 225-226.

³¹⁰ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 23.

³¹¹ These issues are fully covered in Funabashi Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift*.

³¹² Anne M. Dixon, "Can Eagles and Cranes Flock Together? U.S. and Japanese Approaches to Multilateral Security After the Cold War," eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present and Future*, 142-143.

³¹³ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 277-279.

- The U.S. is pursuing a dual diplomacy toward China and Japan
- Japan has become relatively less important
- It is not normal for a foreign country to maintain its military in another independent country for so long
- The United States will protect Japan only within the framework of its own strategy and domestic public opinion at the time that a situation arises.³¹⁴

Overall, despite such views, most Japanese and Americans realize the value of the alliance and the close relationship between the two countries. The United States would likely welcome Japanese martial internationalism due to the contribution to international security it would bring.

2. ASEAN

The countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent a further source of support for Japanese martial internationalism.³¹⁵ While this support would not be nearly as strong as that of the United States and would differ from country to country, it represents a fundamental shift in how the countries of Southeast Asia view Japan.

Japanese attitudes toward the nations of ASEAN shifted following the fall of Saigon and the ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1975. Beginning in 1977, Japanese leaders formulated policies known as *nemawashi*, or “laying the groundwork,” toward establishing better relations with Southeast Asia. First, Japan entered into a Japan-ASEAN Forum to discuss regional security and economic development issues in March of 1977. Later, in August of that year, Prime Minister Fukuda proclaimed three tenets of his “Fukuda Doctrine,” with special emphasis on Southeast Asia. In this doctrine, Fukuda stated that Japan would not become a military power again, that its economic links with ASEAN nations were founded on “heart-to-heart” relationships, and that it would “foster relationships based on mutual understandings”.³¹⁶

³¹⁴ Japanese Diet, Subcommittee on Japan’s Role in International Society (Third Meeting), 9 May 2002. Found [Online] at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/20020509isf.html [1 September 2002].

³¹⁵ ASEAN includes ten member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Singapore, Laos, Myanmar (Burma).

³¹⁶ Mendl, *Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 105.

Lastly, while these declarations somewhat alleviated ASEAN apprehensions concerning Japan, the later American Plaza Accord of 1985 acted as an even more robust facilitator of Japanese interest in the region. This occurred because of swiftly appreciating yen values, higher costs of production in Japan itself, and the subsequent relocation of many Japanese enterprises and industries to the cheaper labor pools of Southeast Asia.³¹⁷ Japanese foreign relations within this region thrived during this period as a function of increased economic activity.

During the 1990s, Japan's relations with ASEAN improved with economic interdependence. Specifically, Japan maintained sizeable interest in Indonesia as its country of greatest concern in the region. The large population and market for Japanese goods, possession of raw materials, including oil, and the geostrategic location of the islands as they straddle Japan's vital trans-oceanic sea lanes all acted as contributing factors to this interest.³¹⁸ The inclusion of Japan as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) beginning in 1994 also evidenced Japan's maintenance of linkages to the region.³¹⁹ A major setback to positive relations occurred during the Asian economic crisis of 1997 when ASEAN nations expected solutions from Japanese financial leadership. Given Japan's own internal economic difficulties, Japanese proposals, including the Asian Monetary Fund, failed to achieve significant results. This diminished Southeast Asian faith in Japan's regional economic leadership.³²⁰

To counter these accusations, Japan engaged in numerous "confidence building measures" with ASEAN nations during the 1990s. These included exchange of unclassified information, maritime cooperation, nuclear non-proliferation, and the control and transfer of conventional weapons.³²¹ Japan's military role in the UN PKO in Cambodia and East Timor were heralded as positive developments in Japan-Southeast Asian relations resulting in "little concern...over a more active Japanese naval presence in the region."³²² Finally, in November

³¹⁷ Nakamura, *A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989*, 471.

³¹⁸ Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 100.

³¹⁹ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 218-221.

³²⁰ Ibid., 244-250.

³²¹ Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, 147-148.

³²² Sheldon W. Simon ed., "Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities," *The Many Faces of Asian Security*, National Bureau of Asian Research, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001), 50.

1999, Japan proposed that ships of the JMSA join with Malaysian, Indonesian, and Singaporean patrols in the Strait of Malacca.³²³ This multinational coast guard would have enhanced powers against piracy and crime. The proposal was met with favorably and one expert in Indonesia recognized it as an important step toward Japan's future involvement in regional security.³²⁴

Thus Japan's efforts at improving relations with Southeast Asia eventually paid off in the form of greater ease with Japanese military activity. In many places, such as the Philippines, war memories remain as strong as in China or the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, the favorable response to Japanese involvement in the region indicates that the nations of ASEAN would probably support Japanese martial internationalism.

3. The United Nations

A Japanese decision to adopt martial internationalism would have far-reaching effects upon Japan's standing in the United Nations. Japan has always been an enthusiastic political and financial supporter of the United Nations and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.³²⁵ Through an active military contribution to United Nations efforts, Japan may finally be able to attain this goal.

Japan argues that it deserves this elevated rank for four main reasons.³²⁶ First, it has made military contributions to peacekeeping since 1992 and substantial civilian/NGO support of UN missions long before that. Second, it asserts its financial contributions are, with the exception of the United States, far more than what other UNSC members contribute making it the second largest donor in the world. In 2000, Japan paid for 20.6 percent of the UN's costs second only to the United States' 39 percent. The other permanent members contributed far less: China 1 percent, Russia 1.1 percent, UK 5.1 percent, and France 6.5 percent.

³²³ Ibid., 66.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ A working paper by University of Newcastle upon Tyne Professor Reinhard Drifte titled "Japan and Security Council Reform: Multilateralism at a Turning Point?" provided useful information on this subject. Paper found [Online] at University of Hawaii website at <<http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/14b.html>> [2 September 2002]

³²⁶ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "An Argument for Japan's Becoming a Permanent Member," [Online] at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/japan.html>> [17 September 2002].

Additionally, since 1989 Japan has been the largest provider of overseas developmental assistance. Third, Japan is a longtime supporter of arms control and non-proliferation. Fourth, Japan has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for eight terms, a feat matched only by Brazil.

Beyond these facts, Japanese leadership also made substantial contributions to UN activities. Japan has made huge contributions to African development during the 1990s when other major powers lost interest in the continent following the end of the Cold War.³²⁷ This was evidenced by its hosting of two international conferences on African Development in 1992 and 1998. Pragmatically, this move was taken given that Africa possesses the largest regional bloc of votes in the UN General Assembly. In 1998, Japan, with Great Britain, was instrumental in resolving a UN crisis over weapons inspectors in Iraq.³²⁸ This was an unprecedented display of leadership by Japan. In its junior role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Japan has traditionally played a relatively unseen part in major negotiations. Finally, Japan has had past support for its bid from three of the five current permanent UNSC members, namely, the United States, Great Britain, and France.

Even with all of these achievements, Japan faces significant obstacles to attaining a leadership position in the United Nations. Many of these arise because of its current ineffectual military policy. First, Japan's lack of collective self-defense policy goes against 1995 UN guidelines on PKO. Second, the 1992 PKO bill remains overly restrictive in its requirements that must be met before the SDF can become involved in a PKO mission. This is particularly true of the stipulation that warring parties must have signed a peace treaty. Third, many countries would feel that the permanent inclusion of Japan on the UNSC would be the height of hypocrisy in that Japan would be making decisions to send other countries' troops into harms' way while theirs remain free from risk. Finally, being on the UNSC involves demonstrating positive and proactive leadership. In other words, this implies that Japan must be a "normal country" and not simply a perceived vassal of the United States.

Conversely, many other impediments exist that are out of Japan's control.³²⁹ For instance, modification of the UNSC first requires the consent of the presiding five members. It

³²⁷ Drifte, "Japan and Security Council Reform: Multilateralism at a Turning Point?", 4-5.

³²⁸ Ibid., 8.

³²⁹ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, 205-207.

is unlikely that China or Russia would support Japan's bid. Furthermore, a two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly is required to alter the UNSC. At present, Japan is also unlikely to gain this much support. Many nations in the General Assembly feel that the inclusion of Japan on the UNSC would give excessive influence to the United States, particularly if Germany were included also. Additionally, they reject the idea of adding yet another "Westernized" and wealthy country of the geopolitical "North" to the UNSC while Africa, South America, the Muslim world, and India are not represented.³³⁰

In consequence, by adopting martial internationalism, Japan can surmount many of the current barriers to permanent UNSC membership that it brings upon itself through its current policies.

F. THE WAR ON TERRORISM – A LOST OPPORTUNITY?

The current global War on Terrorism presents Japan with an ideal starting point for implementing a strategy of martial internationalism. No other enemy is as universally reviled as terrorists, be they Islamist or otherwise. Moreover, terrorist acts by "Super-Empowered Angry Men" will continue to plague the security of the international community long after individual organizations like Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda are eradicated.³³¹ Japan is certainly no stranger to terrorism, having experienced the violence of groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-ha, and the Japanese Red Army.³³² In some respects, the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Tokyo in March 1995 that killed 7 and injured over 4000 people marked the beginning of a new kind of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. Joining in the fight against this global scourge satisfies all three of Japan's international security goals, and yet Japan continues to drift in a state of military policy sluggishness.

In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels described Japan's current activity in the War on Terrorism as a "dual-hedge."³³³

³³⁰ Difte, "Japan and Security Council Reform: Multilateralism at a Turning Point?", 9-11.

³³¹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), 322-329.

³³² Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – "China and Northeast Asia, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002].

³³³ Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, "Japan's Double Game," *Foreign Affairs*, September /

They claim that Japan is, once again, striving to maintain close business relations with its Middle East oil trading partners, while at the same time, engaging in symbolic demonstrations of support for the United States through extremely limited military support of operations in Afghanistan. Although Koizumi made strong pronouncements in his “Seven Point Plan,” after the cameras were off, Japan “backtracked on the bolder elements of...the plan.”³³⁴ As a result, Japan appears to be falling into the same pitfalls it did eleven years ago in the Gulf War.

To Japan’s credit, Koizumi’s government managed to construct the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” at lightning speed by Japanese policy-making standards and against strong political resistance. Public opinion won the day with 57 percent of Japanese polled supporting the dispatch of the SDF to support the American war effort.³³⁵ The new law, however, proved to be yet another half-measure at true military policy reform. It failed to address the potential consequences of sending the SDF into multinational operations without collective security arrangements or provisions for use of force.

Japanese military participation in the War on Terrorism is noteworthy especially given that the last time Japan was an active member of a multinational coalition was during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. In November 2001 MSDF ships deployed to the Indian Ocean and began working with coalition forces. By the end of 2001, the MSDF had provided fleet refueling capability through 75 at-sea replenishments of coalition ships that provided 34.1 million gallons of diesel fuel to American and British vessels at Japanese expense. In addition, ASDF C-130 aircraft completed 51 missions consisting of 166 sorties with 773 tons of cargo and 123 passengers in support of re-supply and transport requirements in the western Pacific Ocean.³³⁶ Several C-130’s also made it all the way to Pakistan to deliver blankets and humanitarian relief supplies before quickly leaving the area.³³⁷ Throughout all of this, China and South Korea did not seriously condemn Japanese military activism in the war on terror.³³⁸

October 2002, (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).

³³⁴ Ibid., 110.

³³⁵ NIDS, *East Asian Strategic Review 2002*, 38.

³³⁶ DefenseLink website [Online] at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf>> [7 September 2002].

³³⁷ Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan’s Double Game,” 116.

³³⁸ Ibid., 55.

Then, beginning in February 2002, the United States military began to reevaluate its praise of its ally. In a Department of Defense statement on February 26, 2002, Japan was not listed among the coalition forces contributing to the War on Terrorism.³³⁹ Shortly after, the U.S. Central Command website stopped displaying listings of Japan's contribution to the war, a situation that has continued to the time of this writing.³⁴⁰

Clearly, something happened that changed Japan's position on its participation in the war. From a security standpoint, Japan feared the threat of increased terrorism to Japan. Politically, the cautiousness of senior leaders outweighed the enthusiasm of junior politicians and public opinion alike.³⁴¹ Most importantly, Japan feared the economic backlash from the Muslim world that overly aggressive activity in the region might bring. Reminiscent of the Gulf War, Japan did not wish to disturb the lucrative trading relationships it had established in the area, especially with Iran.³⁴²

As a lesson to Japan, the most promising development to arise from the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan has been the return of Germany and Italy to the international security community. Both countries possess constitutions that renounce war and both have made impressive contributions to the international effort against Al-Qaeda. To date, over 2,500 German military personnel have operated in Operation Enduring Freedom at sea, in the air, and through numerous operations on the ground including the use of German special forces.³⁴³ Italy, whose constitutional restrictions on use of force are stricter than Germany or Japan's, contributed over 450 ground personnel, numerous aircraft, and a remarkable 13 percent of its entire naval inventory including its carrier battle group to support combat operations in the Northern Arabian Sea.³⁴⁴ Indeed, Kyorin University Professor Takubo Tadae remarked on this situation saying, "Japan should learn from Germany which has acted on rearmament, NATO

³³⁹ Gerry J. Gilmore, "Rumsfeld Praises Coalition Contributions In Anti-Terror War," DefenseLink website, American Forces Press Service, Washington D.C., Feb. 26, 2002 [Online] at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202262.html> [3 September 2002].

³⁴⁰ U.S. Central Command website [Online] at <<http://www.centcom.mil/>> [3 September 2002].

³⁴¹ Heginbotham and Samuels, "Japan's Double Game," 114.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ U.S. Central Command website [Online] at <http://www.Centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/germany.html> [3 September 2002].

³⁴⁴ U.S. Central Command website [Online] at <http://www.Centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/italy.html> [3 September 2002].

membership and international military cooperation in response to changes in the international environment.”³⁴⁵ Alternatively, too many parallels cannot be made between the two countries since, unlike Germany, Japan has not been a member of any multilateral institutions that fostered public political support for defense. As a result, “the political threshold that needs to be crossed before the Self-Defense Forces can engage in combat is much higher in Japan than in Germany.”³⁴⁶ Even so, it is evident that once again, Japan is missing an historic opportunity to rejoin the international community as a normal nation.

³⁴⁵ Japanese Diet, Subcommittee on Japan’s Role in International Society (Fourth Meeting), 6 June 2002, [Online] at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_english.nsf/html/kenpou/english/20020606isf.html> [1 September 2002].

³⁴⁶ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, 209.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

A. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has demonstrated that Japan can best satisfy its international security interests by assuming a combatant role in current and future multinational military coalitions. Japan's international security interests were identified as: (1) shaping a stable international security environment, (2) supporting the United Nations, and (3) upholding the Japan-United States alliance. While other military postures can partially satisfy some of these interests, only martial internationalism can achieve all three successfully.

To defend this argument, the thesis addressed several relevant questions. First, the evolution of Japan's defense policy was examined. This study revealed that Japan has steadily progressed from pacifism to a more independent and assertive military posture, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Second, the thesis explored the nature of Japan's contemporary military policy debate. By describing Japan's political, economic, and military situations, a multitude of competing interests and institutional complexities were discovered. Furthermore, these interests focused centrally upon the critical issues of constitutional revision, collective security, and the use of force by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The manner in which these issues were viewed led each competing interest to prefer different military postures, namely pacifistic internationalism, autonomy, static ambivalence, or martial internationalism. By comparing these postures in terms of Japan's international security interests and domestic factors, martial internationalism rose to the fore.

Third, the thesis identified the potential domestic and international implications of Japan assuming a martial internationalist stance. While widespread domestic debate was determined to be a likely result, this was also not proven a disqualifying factor for the posture's feasibility. Next, Japan's international relations were discussed in relation to martial internationalism. Again, although China and North Korea represented the most likely sources of opposition, these concerns were not overpowering enough to prevent the adoption of the posture. Instead, the support of the United States, Southeast Asia, and the global community as

represented by the United Nations all outweighed the mitigating factors of countries opposed or apprehensive of increased Japanese military activity.

Finally, with a firm grasp of the strategy in hand, the thesis determined that the current War on Terrorism is an ideal starting place for Japan to enact a posture of martial internationalism. This was accomplished by identifying Japan's present policy ambivalence and how it would damage its international prestige if continued through the course of the conflict.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommend that Japan pursue a military policy of martial internationalism as described in this thesis. To effectively accomplish this Japan must:

1. Amend Article 9 of the constitution to relax prohibitions on military activities.
2. Enact legislation to exercise the right of collective defense as described by UN Charter Article 51.
3. Establish rules of engagement and use of force laws that comply with the International Law of Armed Force.
4. Improve training and combat readiness of JSDF for future multinational coalition and peacekeeping missions through vigorous exercises with the United States military.
5. When called for, actively and fully participate in UN-sanctioned coalition operations sharing the same risks and burdens as other democratic nations.

Recommend that the United States assist its ally Japan in implementing a military posture of martial internationalism through the following steps:

1. Utilize American diplomatic influence throughout Asia-Pacific to soothe fears concerning the renewal of Japanese militarism.
2. Welcome and encourage Japan's decision to become a normal nation.

3. Fully integrate SDF forces into U.S. military formations and operations in training exercises and real-world operations.³⁴⁷
4. Establish a free trade agreement with Japan to cement the bonds between Japan and the United States. As Japanese dependence upon the United States lessens in matters of defense, a free trade agreement would demonstrate U.S. support of floundering Japanese economy and bring to an end the cycle of trade-related disputes between Japan and the United States as well as stopping the practice of *gaiatsu* that is so disparaged in Japan.³⁴⁸
5. Revise the Japan-U.S. alliance to reflect Japan's greater military autonomy and collective security agreements with the United States.

In closing, threats to international security continue to flourish in the post-Cold War world. Although the United States has assumed the burden of "global policeman," this arrangement cannot be sustained forever. This thesis has demonstrated Japan's ability to share international security responsibilities with the United States and the United Nations. However, the question remains whether Japan will overcome its military policy ambivalence before other powers take up the challenge and make Japanese influence less consequential.

³⁴⁷ Larry M. Wortzel, "Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan's New Law Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort," [Online] at <<http://www.hertiage.org/Reasearch/NationalSecurity/BG1500.cfm>> [2 September 2002].

³⁴⁸ For a fuller description of this strategy, see Kurt W. Tong, "Revolutionizing America's Japan Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1996-97, #105, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Auer, James E., *The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973)
- BBC News. "Koizumi Hails Peaceful Resolution", BBC News website [Online] at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1293772.stm>> [3 September 2002]
- Beasley, W.G., *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995)
- Berger, Thomas, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998)
- Bracken, Paul. *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*. (New York: Perennial, HarperCollins Publishers, 1999)
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. (New York: Harpers Collins Publishers Inc., 1997)
- Buckley, Roger, *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-1990*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
- Carmody, Denise L. and Carmody, John T. *Eastern Ways to the Center: An Introduction to Asian Religions*. (Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1983)
- Cha, Victor D. *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999)
- Channel News Asia at <http://www.chanelnewsasia.com>
- CIA World Factbook, found [Online] at <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>> [5 September 2002]
- Clean Government Party website [Online] at <<http://www.komei.or.jp/>>
- Cole, Bernard. "Asia at Sea" in *Proceedings*, vol. 123, March 1997 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press)
- Cole, Bernard. *Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century*. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001)
- Cronin, Patrick M. and Green, Michael J. *Redefining the U.S. Japan-Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 1994)
- Cronin, Patrick M. and Green, Michael J., *Redefining the U.S. Japan-Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, McNair Paper 31 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 1994)
- Defense of Japan 1996*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1996)

- Defense of Japan 2000*, (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2000)
- Dower, John W., *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999)
- Drifte, Reinhard. "Japan and Security Council Reform: Multilateralism at a Turning Point?" [Online] at University of Hawaii website
<<http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/14b.html>> [2 September 2002]
- East Asian Strategic Review*, Annual Report of the National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan, 2000)
- East Asian Strategic Review*, Annual Report of the National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan, 2002)
- Edgerton, Robert B., *Warriors of the Rising Sun*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999)
- Fairbank, Reischauer & Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Revised Edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989)
- Flanz, Joeseeph N. *Tightening the Helmet Strings: The Future of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship*. U.S. Army War College Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, April 2000)
- Friedman, George and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991)
- Friedman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999)
- Fukuyama, Francis and Oh, Kongdan. *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993)
- Funabashi, Yoichi, *Alliance Adrift*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999)
- Gilmore, Gerry J. "Rumsfeld Praises Coalition Contributions In Anti-Terror War" on DefenseLink website, American Forces Press Service, Washington D.C., Feb. 26, 2002 [Online] at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202262.html [3 September 2002]
- Glosserman, Brad. "Japan Battles Gulf War Ghosts," in Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Pacific Forum, PacNet Newsletter, #38 September 28, 2001 available [Online] at <<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0138.html>> [16 August 2002]
- Green, Michael J. *Japan's Reluctant Realism*. (New York: Palgrave, 2001)
- Green, Michael J. and Samuels, Richard J., *Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order*. NBR Analysis, Volume 5, No. 4 (Seattle Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1994)

- Green, Michael J., and Patrick M. Cronin eds., *The U.S. Alliance, Past, Present, and Future*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999)
- Harries, Meiron and Susie, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan*, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987)
- Hayes, Louis D. *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, Third Edition, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001)
- Heginbotham, Eric and Samuels, Richard. "Japan's Double Game", *Foreign Affairs*, September / October 2002 (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002)
- Hellman, Pyle, Gilpin, Watanabe, and Kikuchi in *From APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific*. (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997)
- Hook, Steven W. and Spanier, John *American Foreign Policy since World War II* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2000)
- Hoyt, Edwin P., *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WWII*, (New York: Donald I. Fine Inc., 1985)
- Hunsberger, Warren S. ed., *Japan's Quest, The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1997)
- International Institute for Strategic Studies *The Military Balance 1999-2000* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - "China and Northeast Asia, Japan" [Online] at <<http://www.janes.com>> [30 August 2002]
- Japanese Defense Agency website [Online] at <<http://www.jda.go.jp>>
- Japanese House of Councilors website [Online] at <<http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/>> [31 August 2002]
- Japanese House of Representatives website [Online] at <<http://www.shugiin.go.jp/eng>> [31 August 2002]
- Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website [Online] at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp>> [31 August 2002]
- Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2001*. [Online] <<http://www.mofa.go.jp>> [16 August 2002]
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Okawara, Nobuo, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1993)
- Katzenstein, Peter J., Hamilton-Hart Natasha, Kato, Kozo, and Yue Ming eds. *Asian Regionalism*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000)

- Katzenstein, Peter J., *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996)
- Keddel, Jr., Joseph P., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1993)
- Kimura, Soji and Matsuoka, Hisao. "Prospect and Dilemma of the Defense Industry in Japan in the Post Cold-War Era Accommodation to Globalization of Economy", in *National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) Security Reports*, No. 2, March 2001
- Kissinger, Henry A. *Does America Need A Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001)
- L'Estrange, Michael G. *The Internationalization of Japan's Military policy: Challenges and Dilemmas for a Reluctant Power*, (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1990)
- LeFeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997)
- Liberal Party website [Online] at <<http://www.jiyuto.or.jp/ENG>> [4 September 2002]
- Li Cheng, "Jiang Zemin's Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC", in *China Quarterly*, #161, March 2000.
- Lim Yun Suk. "Koreans cut off fingers to protest Yasukuni Shrine visit", *Channelnewsasia.com*, 13 August 2001 [Online] at <<http://cna.mediacorpnews.com/articles/2001/08/13/eastasia528.html>> [15 August 2002]
- Maeda, Tetsuo, *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*, (Chicago: Edition Q Inc., 1995)
- Mandelbaum, Michael ed., *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995)
- McNally, Christopher A. and Morrison, Charles E. eds. *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2002*. (New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002)
- Mendl, Wolf, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, (New York: Routledge, 1995)
- Nakamura, Takafusa, *A History of Showa Japan, 1926-1989*, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998)
- National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan). *Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, Council of Defense-Strategic Studies 1999-2000*. (Tokyo: NIDS, 2001)
- Okazaki, Hisahiko "Japan Must Be Ready to Use Right of Collective Defense" *Daily Yomiuri*, February 26, 2001, [Online] at <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/>> [7 September 2002]

- Okazaki, Hisahiko. "Dispatch of MSDF Vessels Historic, But Only First Step", in *Daily Yomuri*, November 26, 2001. [Online] at <<http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/sdfdisp112601amb.html>> [27 August 2002]
- Okazaki, Hisahiko. *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense*, (Lanham, MD: Abt Associates, University Press of America, 1986)
- Olsen, Edward A., *U.S.-Japan Strategy Reciprocity, A Neo-Internationalist View*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985)
- Ota, Fumio, JMSDF Vice Admiral. "Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 2000-01
- Overholt, William H. "Japan's Economy, at War With Itself" in *Foreign Affairs* January/February 2002. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press)
- Pyle, Kenneth and Heginbotham, Eric "Japan" in *Strategic Asia: Power and Purpose*. (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001)
- Shibusawa, Masahide. *Japan and the Asian Pacific Region: Profile of Change*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984)
- Shimada, Haruo. "The Koizumi Government and Demand-Generating Structural Reform" in *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Summer 2002, vol. 16, No. 2, (Japan Institute of International Affairs)
- Simon, Sheldon W. ed. *The Many Faces of Asian Security*. National Bureau of Asian Research (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001)
- Smith, Patrick, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997)
- The Daily Yomiuri, [Online] at <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/>>
- The Japan Times, [Online] at <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/>>
- The Christian Science Monitor, [Online] at <<http://www.csmonitor.com>>
- The New York Times. "Japan's Prime Minister Pledges Support for American Retaliation", 20 September 2001, B4
- Tong, Kurt W. "Revolutionizing America's Japan Policy" in *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1996-97, #105, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996)
- Uemura, Takeshi "Political Pulse / Tempers Flare at Meeting with Armitage," *Daily Yomiuri Online*. [Online] at <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20020904wo06.html>> [5 September 2002]
- United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, 1995. [Online] at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/training_material/training_material_home.html> [9 September 2002]
- United States Central Command website [Online] at <<http://www.centcom.mil/>>

United States Department of Defense *Defenselink* website [Online] at
<<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/>>

United States Department of Defense Reports *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied.html>>

United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Command on Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, 27 MARCH 2001, [Online] at
<http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2001/010327db.pdf>
[30August 2002]

Wilborn, Thomas L. *Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 1994)

Woolley, Peter J., *Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971-2000*, (Boulder, CO: Rienner Publishers Inc., 2000)

Wortzel, Larry M. "Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan's New Law Commits More Than Words to U.S. Effort", in The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1500, November 5, 2001 [Online] at
<<http://www.hertiage.org/Reasearch/NationalSecurity/BG1500.cfm>>
[2September 2002]

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Dr. James J. Wirtz
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Dr. Edward A. Olsen
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
5. Dr. H. Lyman Miller
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
6. LT Alex R. Greig
Ravenna, Ohio